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ABSTRACT 
The International Fusion Materials Irradiation Facility (IFMIF) is a high energy neutron 
irradiation facility which generates a 14MeV neutron flux with D–Li (Deuterium-Lithium) 
stripping reactions. It’s an international research project designed to test materials 
specimens since this environmental conditions recreate nuclear fusion power plants 
atmosphere. Therefore, the achieved materials database will be utilized to build the inner 
walls, the blanket components, the coating and the isolation of these future power plants. 
An overall availability of 70% is required by IFMIF to guarantee the proper materials 
irradiation; therefore the Reliability, Availability, Maintenance and Inspectionability (RAMI) 
analyses are necessary in the run up to IFMIF construction. These analyses are carried out 
by the Nuclear Engineering Research Group (NERG) in cooperation with CIEMAT. 
Specifically, the following project focuses in the Remote Handling (RH) system used in the 
test and the target maintenance tasks. The staff cannot have access to this area owing to 
the effective dose exceeds the minimum hand maintenance zone (650μSv/year) due to the 
activation of structural materials. Human influence will be an essential factor in these 
maintenance chores; for this reason, this project is a first milestone towards the merge 
between RAMI and Human Reliability Assessment (HRA).  
The Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) model is the means of quantifying the cognitive part 
influence in the Human Failure Event (HFEs) while Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction (THERP) is used for the assessment of the action part. The combination of those 
methods is called Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure (SHARP) and it will 
provide us the tool in order to introduce the human factor in the RAMI analyses as a basic 
event. 
The report shows the strong human factor influence in the RH tasks and, consequently, the 
need to develop a tool which quantifies these effects. Moreover, some conceptual 
improvements of the final equipment design are introduced in those operations or HFEs that 
induce a high level of unavailability. Some of these recommendations are the 
implementation of instrumentation in the RH attachment tool or clamp, the implementation 
of an infrared camera in the cranes or a virtual confinement volume generated by control 
software integrated in the RH where the operator actuates. 
Finally, once all the improvements are taken into account, the mean availability exceeds the 
objective value in the availability allocation of 99.1% during the RH operations: for curative 
interventions is 99.3% and for the long maintenance period is 95.8%. 
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2. Preface 
This Project has been developed from September 2012 to April 2013. The Fusion Energy 
Engineering Laboratory (FEEL) belonging to the Nuclear Engineering Research Group 
(NERG) in cooperation with Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Mediambientales y 
Tecnológicas (CIEMAT) has been working in the International Fusion Materials Irradiation 
Facility (IFMIF) international project since January 2007. The tasks carried out by the FEEL 
during these years have dealt with IFMIF availability goals. Their studies have shown the 
Reliability, Availability, Maintenance and Inspectionability (RAMI) analysis for each facility 
into IFMIF; the test, the accelerator and, in conjunction with this master thesis, the RH 
Remote Handling (RH) system. Moreover, the FEEL has succeeded creating a strong 
failure rate and mean time to repair (MTTR) database for a large number of components 
used into every facility. 
The perception of human factor could have a significant influence on the maintenance tasks 
performed by the RH system appears on the run up to RH Failure Modes, Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) design. So, it was necessary to devise a new tool to estimate 
how the human action affects these maintenance tasks and the global downtime of the 
facility. 
Getting involved in a worldwide project related with nuclear fusion power and achieving a 
working method in order to merge the Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) with the RAMI 
analysis were a positive source of motivation and a great chance to work in a master thesis 
project. 
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3. Introduction 
This project explains a first HRA associated with the IFMIF RH system used in the 
maintenance tasks.  
A HRA is a tool with which the RAMI team attempts to predict how the human factor that 
exists in some tasks involved in a certain system can affect its global downtime. In order to 
accomplish this goal; events, which are caused by human tasks, are given the status of 
“system components” as basic events and they can be used in a RAMI analysis. 
For doing a merge between RAMI analysis and HRA the following inputs are needed: 
 A model of the considered system. The RH system in this case. 
 A planned human tasks procedure. The test and target facilities maintenance tasks 
carried out by the RH system. 
 A FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) of the considered 
system. 
 A Human Failure Event (HFE) database with their Human Error Probability (HEP). 
 A reliability database of every system component. 
Although these inputs were difficult to obtain and many of them required a large amount of 
assumptions, all the provided information has been properly referenced. The model was 
designed taking into account the initial Concept Design Activity (CDA) [1] of IFMIF and the 
different modifications that have been introduced at Key Element technology Phase report 
(KEP) [2], Comprehensive Design Report (CDR) [3] and more updated alternatives. 
Specifically, the arrangement of the RH system, the Test Cell (TC), Access Cell (AC) and 
the rest of the cells adopt the System Design Description Document II (DDD-II) [4] pattern. 
In HEP estimation part, the primary source consulted was the Handbook of Human 
Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications [5]. More references 
will be mentioned in the text. 
This study is a first model and an approach that should be improved and updated at the 
time when the human tasks procedure and the design will be the final ones. 
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3.1. Objectives 
The main aim of the project has been the development of a tool to quantify the HEP 
(Human Error Probability) associated with any human task and the insertion of it in the 
RAMI reviews of IFMIF. Nevertheless, some prior and other objectives have to be reached: 
the modification of the RH FMECA including the human factor, the design of the HFEs 
belonging to the RH FMECA database, the creation of all the Unsafe Actions (UA) and the 
Event Trees (ET) belonging to every HFE, the estimation of all the HEP taking into account 
the cognitive and manual part as the method states and, finally, the merge between the 
HRA and the RH RAMI analysis. 
3.2. Scope 
The scope of the text includes from a brief explanation of fusion power, International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) and Demonstration Power Plant (DEMO), 
IFMIF and the facilities it is developed with; until the merge between the RAMI and the HRA. 
In addition, the RH system design is widely described.  
Nonetheless, as it already mentioned the main aim of the project has been the development 
of a tool to quantify the HEP associated with any human task and the insertion of it in the 
RAMI reviews of IFMIF. This instrument for HEP calculation had to fulfill methods already 
validated; for this reason, different HRA sources have been studied and properly referenced 
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4. Fusion power 
4.1. The nuclear fusion 
Nuclear fusion is the reaction by which two or more atomic nuclei collide and join together to 
form a new heavier atomic nucleus. The fusion of two nuclei with lower masses than iron or 
nickel (which have the largest binding energy per nucleon) generally releases energy, while 
the fusion of nuclei heavier than iron absorbs energy. The matter is not conserved during 
the process due to the mass defect. So, fusion generally occurs for lighter elements only 
and their mass loss is converted to energy released following the Einstein equation E=m·c
2
. 
In spite of this energy is generated by the stars by means of nuclear fusion of hydrogen 
nuclei into helium; their production artificially with the aim of generating electricity is a 
laborious task. This research and development work has been conducted for over the last 
60 years and it has encountered with great scientific and technological challenges. The 
electrostatic repulsion force between the positively charged protons of the nuclei has to be 
overcome before fusion can occur. If two nuclei can be brought close enough together (very 
short distance between them), the nuclear force of attraction is stronger than the 
electrostatic and the last one can be surpassed. Therefore the prerequisite for fusion is that 
the nuclei have enough kinetic energy that they can approach each other despite the 
electrostatic repulsion. This minimum energy is called the Coulomb barrier.  
The Lawson criterion defines the conditions needed for a fusion reaction to reach the 
ignition, that is, that the heating of the plasma by the products of the fusion reactions is 
sufficient to maintain the temperature of the plasma against all losses without external 
power input. These conditions are three: 
 The electron density, ne 
 Plasma temperature, T 
 The confinement time, τe 







   (Eq.  4.1) 
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The reaction cross section σ is a measure of the probability of a reaction and the Coulomb 
barrier is smallest for isotopes of hydrogen, as their nuclei contain only a single positive 
charge.  
 
Fig. 1 – Cross section for different fusion reactions 
The previous graphic shows that the reaction D-T (Deuterium-Tritium) is the easiest to 
achieve and it needs a relatively low energy to reach the maximum probability to take place 
the fusion process. 
 
Fig. 2 – D-T fusion reaction 
As a result, the future fusion power reactors will use D-T because this reaction has been 
identified as the most efficient for fusion devices. Moreover, D can be found plentifully on 
Earth; on the other hand, T is extremely rare on nature because it is radioactive with 12.3 
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years half-life, but can be created in another reaction using the neutrons produced in the 
fusion reaction: 
An important number of “fusion machines” have been gradually refined along the years and 
the Tokamak has become de dominant concept in fusion research and multiplied around 
the globe. Scientists have designed the next steps called ITER and DEMO, and they will be 
explained in the following section. 
4.2. The ITER and DEMO projects 
Attempts at controlling fusion for power production follow two main experimental 
approaches that are being studied: the magnetic confinement and the inertial confinement. 
The first method uses strong magnetic fields to contain the hot plasma while the second 
involves compressing a small sphere containing fusion fuel to extremely high densities using 
strong lasers or particle beams. 
Nowadays, the magnetic method is the most developed and two configurations can be 
used: the mirror confinement and the toroidal confinement. There are several types of 
toroidal confinement system; the most important are Tokamaks and Stellarators devices. As 
stated before, Tokamak is the dominant concept in fusion research where charged particles 
describe a helix trajectory along the magnetic toroidal field lines created by a series of coils 
evenly spaced around the torus-shaped reactor, and the poloidal field created by a system 
of horizontal coils outside the toroidal magnet structure. A strong electric current is induced 
in the plasma using a central solenoid (transformer), and this induced current also 
contributes to the poloidal field. In this way, the plasma is confined properly despite of the 
reactor works by pulses as the transformer has to be recharged. 
More than 200 Tokamaks have been built around the world. The Joint European Torus 
(JET); in Culham, U.K., in operation since 1983, achieved the world's first controlled release 
of fusion power. The Tore Supra Tokamak in Cadarache holds the record for the longest 
plasma duration time of any Tokamak: six minutes and 30 seconds. The Japanese JT-60 
achieved the highest value of fusion triple product: density, temperature and confinement 




). US fusion installations have reached 
temperatures of several hundred million degrees Celsius. 
THeLin  42
6
3  (Eq.  4.2) 
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Achievements like these have led fusion science to an exciting threshold: the long sought-
after plasma energy breakeven point. Breakeven describes the moment when plasmas in a 
fusion device release at least as much energy as is required to produce them. Plasma 
energy breakeven has never been achieved: the current record for energy release is held by 
JET, which succeeded in generating 70 percent of input power. 
The next step is called ITER, a large-scale scientific experiment that includes China, the 
European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States, which will produce 
more power than it consumes: for 50 MW of input power, 500 MW of output power will be 
produced. ITER will try to prove the viability of fusion as an energy source and to collect the 
data necessary for the design and subsequent operation of the first electricity-producing 
fusion power plant. Its construction began in 2007 in Cadarache, France; and the first 
plasma is expected to be produced in 2020. 
 
Fig. 3 – From the ITER Design Office, a detailed model of the ITER Tokamak. Image Credit: ITER Organization 
2011 
The main aim of ITER is: 
 to produce ten times more thermal energy from fusion heating than is supplied by 
auxiliary heating 
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Moreover, ITER’s secondary targets are:  
 To produce a steady-state plasma which generate five times more energy than it 
consumes. 
 To maintain a fusion pulse for up to 480 seconds. 
 To develop experimental technologies needed for a fusion power plant, including 
superconducting magnets and RH. 
 To approach to the ignition. 
 To verify T breeding concepts. 
 To refine neutron shield/heat conversion technology. 
ITER is not an end in itself: it is the bridge toward a first plant that will demonstrate the 
large-scale production of electrical power and tritium fuel self-sufficiency. DEMO is this 
following step. To achieve this in the shortest timescale, studies have shown that aside from 
the operation of ITER, a parallel program of materials testing would be needed. 
Development of these materials is the prime purpose of the IFMIF. It’s expected that the 
DEMO conceptual design could be complete by 2017. 
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5. The international fusion materials irradiation 
facility 
As stated above, IFMIF is an international scientific research program designed to test 
materials for suitability for use in the fusion reactors, in particular, DEMO. This project is 
planned by Japan, the European Union, the United States and Russia, and managed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
5.1. IFMIF requirements 
The main aim is to recreate the conditions that there are inside the reactor and to bombard 
with them the tested materials. A particle accelerator-based neutron source to produce a 
large neutron flux is used to guarantee this principal goal and, thus, to develop and qualify 
the radiation resistant and low activation for the specimens. The generated conditions are: 





 of neutron flux  
 A damage rate of 20 dpa/fpy (displacements per atom/full power year) 
The IFMIF is made up of five different facilities: the accelerator, the target, the test, the 
conventional systems and the central control. In order to reproduce a reactor in continuous 
operation, an overall availability of 70% is required to reach accumulated damage levels 
around 100 dpa in a few years of operation. The availability requirements are affected for 
the scheduled maintenance plan for the annual campaign: 
 One long maintenance period of 20 days; mainly for the target, the test modules 
replacement and the accelerator. The RH tasks will be carried out during this time.  
 One intermediate period of 3 days for the replacement of boron nitride disks of the 
ion source and fast activities in the accelerator and other conventional systems.  
Table 1 – Required IFMIF availability goals for different facilities 
IFMIF Facilities Current requirements 
Tests Facility 96% 
Target Facility 94% 
Accelerator Facility 87% 
Conventional Facilities 98% 
Central Control System and Common Instr. 98% 
TOTAL (product) 75% 
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The previous table has been obtained from the Accelerator Facility RAMI Report DDD-II 
[6]. 
 
Fig. 4 – Overview of the IFMIF design, with major subsystems identified from the CDR[3] 
 
 
The following is a brief description of the different facilities.  
5.2. Accelerator facility 
IFMIF uses two 40MeV deuteron Continuous-Wave linear accelerators; each delivers a 
125mA beam current directed to a common flowing Li (lithium) target [3]. Each IFMIF 
accelerator is a sequence of acceleration and beam transport stages. The deuteron beam is 
produced and extracted from an Electron Cyclotron Resonance Ion Source (ECRIS) at 
100keV. A Low Energy Beam Transport (LEBT) section guides the deuteron beam from the 
source to a Radio Frequency Quadrupole (RFQ). The RFQ bunches the beam and 
accelerates 125mA to 5MeV. The RFQ output beam is injected through a matching section 
called Medium Energy Beam Transport line (MEBT), which guides the beam up to the next 
accelerating system: Superconducting Radio Frequency Linac (SRF), composed of four 
cryomodules totalizing 42 superconducting cavities and 21 solenoids, bring the beam 
energy to 40MeV, and finally a High Energy Beam Transport line (HEBT) guides and 
shapes the beam to produce a rectangular and uniform footprint at the level of the lithium 
target. [7] 
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 Injector 
It consists of the ECRIS and the LEBT. The first one generates deuterons in 
Continuous-Wave mode at 100 KeV working as follows: Gas (Deuterium, in this 
case) is injected in a chamber and it’s heated up with microwave radiation. The gas 
is ionized and the free electrons are kept in the chamber describing helicoidal orbits 
by means of magnetic fields. The collisions between theses free electrons and D 
atoms produce more ions that can feed the continuous wave beam. The LEBT is a 
pair of weak focusing magnets that has to match the beam to the RFQ input needs. 
There is also a couple of dipoles or steerers which are optical elements used to 
focus the beam in the transverse directions if it deviate. [7] 
 
Fig. 5 – IFMIF injector sections[7] 
 
 
 Radio Frequency Quadrapole 
The beam is accelerated since 100KeV to 5MeV and bunched to reach the 175 MHz 
frequency required for the SRF Linear Accelerator. 
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Fig. 6 – Example of Radio Frequency Quadrapole cavity[7] 
 
 
 Medium Energy Beam Transport 
Its function will be a more accurate adaptation for the SRF linac inputs. MEBT 
focuses the beam in transverse using 1 triplet and 1 doublet quadrapoles and in 
longitudinal with 2 buncher cavities.  
 
 Superconducting Radio Frequency Linear Accelerator 
This is the main part of the accelerator, where the beam is accelerated from 5 to 40 
MeV. It is composed of 4 cryomodules. They focus the beam with solenoids and 
they accelerate it using superconducting Half Wave Resonators. A Half-wave 
resonator is a cavity made to match its measures with half the wavelength of the 
electric field in it. This way a resonance is generated and the amplitude is enhanced, 
and the energy associated to it (and transmitted to the particles) is much higher. The 
cryomodules have in total 21 solenoids and 42 resonators. 
 
Fig. 7 – General view of an IFMIF cryomodule[7] 
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Fig. 8 – Cavities equipped with their power couplers and the superconducting solenoids[7]  
 
 High Energy Beam Transport 
Finally, a HEBT line focuses the beam by means of quadrupoles and homogenizes 
the beam density by means of higher order multipoles, bends it by means of two 
dipoles and expands and matches it to the required rectangular and uniform 
footprint at the level of the lithium target. [7] 
5.3. Target facility 
The IFMIF Li target system shall be designed to have a capability of removal of 10MW heat 
power produced by the deuterium beams, to produce a stable Li jet with a wave amplitude 
less than 1mm at a speed of 10–20m/s, to control level of the impurities (T, Be-7, C, O, N) 
below permissible values, to have sufficient safety with respect to the Li hazard and tritium 
release from the Li loop and to achieve required system availability during plant lifetime. 
Specifically, the major function of the IFMIF Li target is to provide a stable Li jet where the 
accelerated deuterium beam to 40 MeV collides against. This reaction produces high 
energy neutrons in a range around 14MeV.The flux of neutrons reproduce a nuclear fusion 
energy reactor environment. The explained design follows the Status of engineering design 
of liquid lithium target in IFMIF-EVEDA [8] model. 
The Li target consists of the target assembly, the Li loop, Li purification loop and the 
diagnostics. In addition, the RH systems will have to carry out a lot of tasks in this facility. 
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 Target Assembly 
The Target Assembly (TA) consists of a flow straightener, a double-reducer nozzle, 
a back-plate, drain baffles and flanges. The flow straightener is provided to change 
turbulent flow to laminar flow. The back-plate operates under severe conditions of 
neutron irradiation damage (about 50dpa/fpy) and its design has been updated 
regularly. It’s planned its replacement every 11 months using RH. 
 
Fig. 9 – Concept of the back-plate and the nozzle[8] 
 
 Li main loop 
The major components of the Li main loop are a quench tank, a surge or overflow 
tank, a Li dump tank, an organic dump tank, an electromagnetic pump, and two heat 
exchangers. The total Li inventory is about 9m
3
. In addition, there are a trace heating 
system to maintain the temperature throughout the loop above the melting point of 
the Li, thermal insulation layer, valves, electromagnetic flow meters, instrumentation, 
and connections to vacuum pump and argon gas headers. Almost all Be-7 produced 
by D-Li reaction, 5.02·10
15
 Bq, would be deposited in the form of Be3N2 on most 
downstream parts of the heat exchanger with the lowest temperature among the 
main flow. 
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Fig. 10 – Block diagram and layout of the Li target system[8] 
 Li purification loop 
The Li purification loop consists of a cold trap and two hot traps to remove various 
impurities and auxiliary supporting equipment (small electromagnetic pump, flow 
meters, valves, trace heaters, and connections to argon/vacuum headers). The cold 
trap removes most of the Be-7 and oxygen, but some is expected to deposit inside 
the loop such as heat exchanger. Nitrogen will be removed by one of the hot trap 
with Titanium and Hydrogen isotopes (H, D, and T) will be removed by the other hot 
trap with Yttrium. Moreover, there will be an off-line and on-line impurity monitors.  
 Diagnostics 
In order to evaluate characteristics of the Li flow during operation and to control the 
Li target system, candidate diagnostics on surface wave characteristics, Li flow 
velocity, Li thickness, Li temperature and displacement of the TA and in the back-
plate are considered. A fast video camera applying the Particle Image Velocity 
technique, ultrasonic sensors, contact-type movable sensors, thermo-couples, an 
infrared camera and a laser diagnostic will be used for these tasks. 
 RH system 
This system will be explained in detail in the following section. Since severe 
activation of the target assembly components is expected under neutron irradiation, 
the repair, inspection and maintenance of IFMIF target system components has to 
be carried out remotely. In addition, the back-plate and the target assembly are the 
most critical part to be maintained in the target. 
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5.4. Test facility 
As defined in [1] and [9] the test facility is the cavity that accommodates the Li target 
assembly and the test modules (TMs) where the material specimens will be 
irradiated. Each TM is connected with TC through respective Test Module Interface 
Head (TMIH). Moreover, the test has to provide sufficient shielding between the TC 
and the non-irradiation area and a convenient access for RH tools to operate on the 
TM and the Li Target Assembly. 
 
Fig. 11 – IFMIF test facility[9] 
 
The TC will allocate the High Flux Test Module (HFTM), the Medium Flux Test module 
(MFTM); including the Creep Fatigue Test Module (CFTM), the Neutron Spectrum Shifter 
(NSS), the Tritium Release Test Module (TRTM), the Liquid Breeder Validation Module 
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(LBVM) and the Low Flux Test Module (LFTM)[9]. Four modules are considered in this 
report since the layout is constantly updated and the assembly will change every year 
depending on the experiment developed. 
 
Fig. 12 – HFTM with its TMIH (Test Module Interface Head)[9] 
 
The AC is foreseen as a closed cavity located directly at the top of the TC to accommodate 
all of the necessary RH tools and systems required for all of the operations, including the 
handling of all of the removable components. The removable components will include: all of 
the TMs, the target assembly, the back-plate, Top Shielding Plugs (TSPs), TC Cover Plate 
(TCCP) and Piping and Cabling Plugs (PCPs). According to the IFMIF CDR report[3] the 
Test Module Handling Cell (TMHC) is a hot cell located directly between the AC and the 
Post Irradiation Examination (PIE) facilities. However, the final design is not decided and, 
currently, the TMHC is divided into several connected cells which will be explained in the 
following section and it is located below the AC. 
In the current TC design[9], the Li quench tank is arranged outside the TC. This is a 
significant change from the previous TC concepts and designs[1][2][3]. The main motivation 
of this configuration change is to reduce the inventory inside the TC, reduce activation of the 
quench tank, and provide it convenient maintainability.  
5.5. Conventional facilities 
These facilities are the building in which all the other and the ancillary systems will be 
housed. It will be possible to group their buildings in separate complexes.  
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Besides housing for the main process facilities, the Conventional Facilities also include other 
systems: 
 Heat extraction system: needed to cool down different parts of the accelerator, the Li 
loop and the test. 
 Electrical power distribution system: each facility needs a high reliability feed to 
operate safely and efficiently. 
 Ventilation and air conditioning: it has to ensure air quality for all the areas where 
personnel accesses. Moreover, it has a radiological protection function. 
 Gas supply system: it provides a dry inert gas. 
 Central vacuum system: the manifold is evacuated by a series of pumps that 
discharge exhaust at atmospheric pressure. 
 Water system: it is required to supply plant process and domestic uses. Separate 
systems are required for potable water, fire protection water and process water. 
 Radioactive waste treatment facilities: it keeps activated pieces and liquids for the 
established time, until primary cooling and proceed in the convenient way in each 
case. 
 Neutron Monitoring: Online neutron detection methods that were considered include; 
gamma thermometers, activation wires, bubble detectors, and activation counters.  
5.6. Central control system and common instrumentation 
The central control and common instrumentation system provides overall control and 
monitoring of IFMIF operation and personnel access and to assure safety. The IFMIF 
facilities will be controlled and operated by a hierarchical architecture in which each of the 
facilities will have dedicated control systems linked to the plant central control system. 
The common instrumentation is made up of the radiation monitoring system, a video 
system, an access control system using door limit switches and keypad combinations, 
monitors, portable survey meters and personal dosimeters. 
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6. REMOTE HANDLING 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This section contains a description of what RH is, a brief list with the facilities around the 
world that use RH tools and the design of the RH system for the AC ant the TC inside IFMIF 
according to the DDD-II model [4]. In addition, the RAMI requirements for this equipment 
and the former FMECA considered are shown. 
Firstly, it’s necessary to understand the reasons which forced the use of remote handled 
operations.  
One of the most technically challenging activities of the IFMIF facility is the maintenance 
and the refurbishment of its components, and among these the target system and the test 
modules appear to be critical since it is located in the most severe region of neutron 
irradiation. [10] Thus, the use of RH tasks is justified, based on: 
 A frequent maintenance and replacement cycle: a long annual maintenance period 
of 20 days that should not affect the overall availability of IFMIF. 
 The radioactive environment: the effective dose exceeds the minimum hand 
maintenance zone (650μSv/year) due to the gamma and beta radiation as a result of 
contamination and activation by elements such as Tritium, Cobalt 60, Beryllium 7… 
Hence, this report will be a further contribution to the strong effort between the IFMIF 
community is being focused on the improvement of the RH strategy for the maintenance 
tasks which must be performed rapidly and with high standards of safety and reliability. 
It’s important to highlight that the final design of both the RH system/equipment and the 
maintenance procedures will have to fulfill a great number of physical characteristics 
because there are heavy components, a limited access due to the shielding and a high 
degree of component modularization. 
6.2. Experience and facilities that use remote handling 
The use of tools and equipment with a higher level of remotisation and automation is 
becoming more common in different technology and industrial fields due to the improvement 
of their safety and productivity. The RH equipment can be classified into three categories: 
 Transporters: cranes, mobile robots/trolleys, telescopic transporters. 
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 Teleoperators: master-slave manipulators, servo manipulators, electro-mechanical 
manipulators. 
 Robotic manipulators: industrial robots, force/haptic controlled manipulators. 
The following is a brief list that shows some facilities with RH technology: 
1) Fission power plants 
In the context of nuclear power plants, the use of cranes and master-slave 
manipulators is important and they are common tools. This equipment carries out 
tasks in the transport of spent fuel and spent fuel casks, maintenance, rescue, 
inspection actions, dismantling and decontamination. In particular, master-slave 
manipulators have been extensively used in the nuclear industries governed by the 
ALARA principle for more than five decades [11]. 
 








2) Reprocessing plants 
Once again, in these plants the RH is used in ordinary tasks and dismantling 
activities. 
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Fig. 15 – Crane used in a reprocessing plant 
  
 
Fig. 16 – Remote-controlled manipulator carrier system 
for dismantling activities in the Wiederaufbereitungsanlage 
Karlsruhe (WAK) reprocessing plant which is under 
decommissioning 
3) Fusion facilities 
Many complex activated fusion machines around the world rely solely on RH to carry 
out maintenance and repair tasks such as JET (Joint European Torus) [12], TPX 
(Tokamak Physics Experiment) [13], FERF (Fusion Engineering Research Facility) 
[14], BPX (Burning Plasma Experiment) [15] and ITER (proposed) [16]. Moreover, 
the robot called Articulated Inspection Arm (AIA) conceived to unfold in a plasma 
chamber without loss of high vacuum and temperature conditions has been set up 
on Tore Supra. This experience demonstrates the possibilities of ITER to use a 
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Fig. 17 – The blanket RH system for 
ITER 
 
Fig. 18 – AIA in Tore Supra 
 




Fig. 20 – RH vehicle and manipulator in TPX 
 
Fig. 21 – Manipulator in JET
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4) Accelerator target facilities 
Design for remote handling of highly activated accelerator components is becoming more 
prevalent as particles facilities are designed and constructed to provide ever increasing 
beam powers. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has made significant contributions to 
telerobotics technology and continues with active research today, for example the SNS 
(Spallation Neutron Source) [11]. The RIA (Rare Isotope Accelerator) will be a basic science 
user facility to generate high-energy, high-quality particle beams of rare isotopes for nuclear 
physics studies. The RIA facility will require remote maintenance capabilities in its target 
gallery and other associated process areas [18]. Another example of remote handling can 
be found at the ISOLDE facility where a robot is used to change radioactive ion beam 
targets. The ISOLDE facility is dedicated to the production of a large variety of radioactive 
ion beams. The TRIUMF-ISAC (Isotope Separator and Accelerator), the PSI (Paul 
Scherrer Institut) proton accelerator, the ILC (International Linear Collider) and the 
LANSCE IPF (Isotope Production Facility) are facilities which produce rare-isotope or 
proton beams and are only some more examples that use RH equipment. Also noteworthy 
is the RH system that will be used in the FRIB (Facility for Rare Isotopes Beams); a new 
national user facility for nuclear science, funded by the Department of Energy Office of 
Science (DOE-SC), Michigan State University (MSU), and the State of Michigan, because 
this equipment shares some of the IFMIF design characteristics. IFMIF would be included in 
this family. 
 
Fig. 22 – Remote manipulator for the 
SNS in the ORNL 
 
Fig. 23 – Elevation view of the FRIB target 
facility hot cell with remote gantry crane and 
servo manipulator
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Fig. 24 – A worker unloads an IPF-
irradiated target at a hot cell in 
LANSCE 
 
Fig. 25 – Remote manipulator for RIA 
 
Fig. 26 – Remote manipulator for RIA 
 
Fig. 27 – Remote crane for ISAC-
TRIUMF targets
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Fig. 28 – Remote handling for the ILC positron target 
5) Other fields 
Lastly, the use of RH technology is not just present in the nuclear and physics field 
but it is common in many other industries such as the aerospace industry, security 
and military activities, medical treatment, underwater vehicles, etc.  
 
Fig. 29 – The da Vinci Surgical remote system
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 Fig. 30 – JASON, a remote 
underwater vehicle 
 
Fig. 31 – The Multi-Use Remote 
Manipulator Development Facility 
(MRMDF) designed by the NASA 
 
6.3. Remote Handling in IFMIF 
6.3.1. Basic configuration of the Test Cell, Access Cell and Test Module 
Handling Cell 
Firstly, it is essential to explain and describe the area where the RH system remains and will 
carry out its tasks. As stated above, the AC is foreseen as a closed cavity located directly at 
the top of the TC to accommodate all of the necessary RH tools and systems required for all 
of the operations, including the handling of all of the removable components. When IFMIF is 
in operation the AC is a restricted area and a control of access will be required; on the other 
hand, during the maintenance period its access will be forbidden. The TMHC is a hot cell 
located next to the TC and under the AC and it is divided into several connected cells. 
Nonetheless, the design of these cells is constantly updated and the definitive one is not 
decided. In this report it has been accepted the configuration described in the System 
Design Description Document (DDD-II) RH systems PBS 2.6.0.0.0 [4] and System Design 
Description Document (DDD) Test Cell, Access Cell, and Test Module Handling Cell [19].  
The installation of the RH equipment imposes some requirements to the layout of the 
facility. In particular, it is an input data for the specifications of the AC, TC, TMHC and their 
interfaces:  
 space required for the RH equipment installation and maintenance  
 space required for the operations and procedures  
 load capacity of the building structures  
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 adequate access for the assembly of the RH equipment during the construction of 
the facility 
The cells distribution will be as shown on the next figures with these requirements and 
considering the functions and tasks which will be described below.  
 
Fig. 32 – Section of Access Cell with the two cranes installed. Note that one side wall of the cell has been removed 
in the drawing[4] 
 
Fig. 33 – AC floor with the access to cells. Currently, the TMHC is made up of the CHC, RAC, TMAC, 
RHC and Tritium Hot Cell[4] 




Fig. 34 – Isometric view of the current layout of Test Facilities, showing both loading stations and 
workshops[4] 
 
6.3.2. RH functions 
The basic functions preliminary identified are: 
 F1: to remove the irradiated modules from the TC and install the new ones during 
the yearly scheduled maintenance period 
 F2: to remove the TA from the TC and install the new one during the yearly 
scheduled maintenance period 
 F3: to perform the required preventive maintenance tasks in the Test Facilities 
 F4: to perform the curative maintenance of those cells and their components when 
required 
 F5: to support the Test Facilities installation and commissioning phases  
 F6: to support the Test Facilities decommissioning 
Therefore the RH system must be able to carry out different subtasks such as welding, 
cutting, bolting, horizontal movements, lifting… These duties and their times will be shown in 
the RH FMECA (appendix A). 
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6.3.3. The components to be manipulated 
The boundaries of the RH system are the systems or components related to the RH 
systems through a physical or a functional interface. The main boundaries of the RH 
systems are listed below: 
 The components to be manipulated (part of them belong to the Test Facility, to the 
Target Facility and to the Accelerator Facility) 
 The cells where the RH systems operate or have some interaction  
 Auxiliary systems of the Test Facilities (electrical power supply, hydraulic power 
supply, etc.) 
 The IFMIF central control system  
 The Wastes Management System 
Specifically, just the components to be manipulated will be described in this section in spite 
of the rest of boundaries have been taken into account when it comes to elaborate the RH 
FMECA (appendix A). Also, the RH fault tree (appendix H) developed in the RAMI analysis 
shows the potential faults associated to the power supply, the control system… 
The weight, size and frequency of replacement/handling of components impose 
requirements for the definition of the technical specifications of the RH equipment. On the 
other hand, the RH systems impose some requirements on the components to be 
manipulated, since they must be designed RH compatible, following RH design guidelines 
and considering their maintainability. 
The components to be handled in the AC and the TC of IFMIF are listed and briefly 
described and showed jointly in the figure 11: 
 TCCP (Test Cell Cover Plate): It is located in the AC and has a minimum frequency 
of maintenance of 1 time per year (due to replacement of TA and TMs). It is 
assumed weights less than 120 Ton. 
 
 
Fig. 35 – TCCP (About 6m x 4.9m x 50 mm high)[4] 
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 TSP (Top Shielding Plug): It is located in the AC and has a minimum frequency of 
maintenance of 1 time per year (due to replacement of TA and TMs). It is assumed 
weights about 120 Ton. 
 
 
Fig. 36 – TSP (About 5.56m x 4.4m x 1.25 m high)[4] 
 
 LSP (Lower Shielding Plug): It is located in the TC and has a minimum frequency 
of maintenance of 1 time per year (due to replacement of TA and TMs). It is 
assumed weights about 80 Ton. 
 
 
Fig. 37 – LSP (About 4.7m x 3.6 m x 1.25 m high)[4] 
 
 PCPs (Piping and Cabling Plug): They are in the TC but the first connections are 
in the AC. PCPs have a non-scheduled replacement (replacement due to failure). It 
is assumed weights about 15 Ton. There are four main configurations and some 
alternative. 
 
Fig. 38 – AC connections (pipes and cables coming from PCPs)[4] 
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Fig. 39 – PCP-1 (PCP-4 mirror) (About 2.16m x 1.2m x 3.2m (high)[4] 
 
 
Fig. 40 – PCP-2 (PCP-5 mirror) (About 2.16m x 1.3m x 3.2m (high)[4] 
 
 
Fig. 41 – PCP-3 (About 1.94m x 1.4m x 3.2m (high)[4] 
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Fig. 42 – PCP-7 (About 2.16m x 1.2m x 3.2m (high)[4] 
 
 TMs (Test Modules): They are in the TC. Their weights are assumed to be around 
180-500kg.  As stated above, there are six different modules: the HFTM, the MFTM; 
including the CFTM, the NSS, the TRTM, the LBVM and the LFTM. Four modules 
with the HFTM specifications have been considered when it comes to develop the 
RAMI analysis (times and technical characteristics). The configuration of this 
assembly will depend on the experiment carried out every year of operation. So, 
they have a frequency of maintenance of 1 time per year, except the LFTM. In the 
present concept it seems that the overall structure of the LFTM will not be replaced 
once per year, only the experiments. However, it could be necessary to replace the 
whole module some time during the IFMIF lifetime. Each TM is connected with TC 
through respective TMIH where the cable and pipe jumpers are attached (it is shown 
in the figure 12). 
 
Fig. 43 – HFTM (About 1.8m wide x 2.4 m high x 0.4m depth)[4] 
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Fig. 45 – LBVM (About 2.5m wide x 0.5m depth (1.2m including upper pipes) and 3m high)[4] 
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Fig. 46 – LFTM (About 2m wide, depth)[4] 
 
 Target assembly: It is in the TC and has a frequency of maintenance of 1 time per 
year. It is assumed a weight about 1 Ton. This component needs different tasks of 
bolting/unbolting, welding and cutting due to its assembly that is shown in the next 
figure. However, it is just one of the various layouts existing; so the final one is not 
known.  
 
Fig. 47 – Integral Target Assembly[4] 
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6.3.4. System design description 
In this section the RH components are detailed described. 
6.3.4.1. Cranes 
As shown in figure 32, there will be two cranes inside the AC: 
I. Heavy Rope Overhead Crane (HROC) 
The HROC is a nuclear grade multi-rope double beam overhead crane. It is 
located in the AC to perform transfer operations of any component, specially 
such components weighting more than 1 Ton: 
o the extraction / introduction of the TSP and LSP for the TC 
o the lifting / placing the TCCP 
o the location and lowering/lifting of the TMs if necessary due to 
rescue 
o the extraction / introduction of the PCPs in case of failure  
o other 
This crane will be designed according to NUREG-0554 [20] for the safe handling of the 
loads, so that a single failure will not result in the loss of the capability of the system to 
safely retain the load. All the critical mechanisms must be duplicated. Using the RAMI 
analysis shown in this report, it will be possible to detect these critical components since the 
failure rates and MTTRs have been obtained from a validated FEEL database.  
The most important characteristics and the technical specifications of the crane are listed in 
the following paragraphs:  
 Trolley: composed of four wheels, with only two of them motorized, with motor 
reducer and brakes. 
 Bridge: the mechanism of the bridged translation is formed of a motor-reducer and a 
cable winding drum on each side of the long walls of the building (two loops in total). 
Each drum has a dual coil, which in a sense coils up the cable and unwinds in the 
other. One wire is attached to the crane on the side facing the mechanism and the 
other, through a forwarding pulley located in the opposite side of the AC, is fastened 
on the opposite side of the crane. A tensioning system on each loop keeps the cable 
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rigid to prevent the crane swings in the case the cables are slightly loose. Thus, this 
mechanism allows the maintenance and the recovery and rescue of the crane in 
case of failure. 
 Degrees of freedom: there are 6; lifting, trolley, longitudinal, vertical axis rotation of 
the load and, two more degrees given by the auxiliary hoist lifting and transversal 
displacement. 
 Working speeds: high precision vector control inverters shall be used: 
o Main hoist, lifting, full load: 0.0 m/min to 3 m/min. 
o Auxiliary hoist: lifting, full load: 0 m/min to 7 m/min. Transversal: 0 m/min to 2 
m/min. 
o Trolley speed: 0.01m/min to 10 m/min.  
o Crane translation speed: 0.01m/min to 10 m/min. 
o Rotation speed: 0.25 rpm. 
 Weight of the crane: 60-75 Ton 
 Estimation of cost: 6M€ - 8M€ 
 
Fig. 48 – Double beam overhead heavy cranes similar to the HROC proposed for AC of IFMIF[4] 
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II. Access Cell Mast Crane (ACMC) 
The ACMC will be a nuclear grade double beam overhead crane equipped 
with a telescopic mast. It will be installed in the AC to support and locate the 
Combined Manipulator System (CMS) at the correct point in the AC and 
therefore allowing the RH operations carried out by that servomanipulator. A 
Mast Grapple (MG) for vertical handling of components up to 1 ton will be 
also installed at the end of the telescopic mast. 
The crane may be equipped with an Auxiliary Hoist of ~3 Ton load. The 
operations performed by this crane are among others: 
o lifting of the TMs  
o transfer the irradiated TMs from the TC to another cell  
o transfer any other component weighting less than 1 ton  
o the TA will also be manipulated by the ACMC. 
The most important characteristics and the technical specifications of the 
crane, designed according to NUREG-0554 [20] too, are listed in the 
following paragraphs: 
 Trolley: ~3 Ton (it is the approximate load supported by the trolley) 
 Telescopic mast (without any servomanipulator attached): 1500 kg 
(1000 for the load and 500 for the servomanipulator) 
 Degrees of freedom: there are 4; trolley, longitudinal, telescopic mast 
lifting and rotation of the telescopic mast. Three extra for the MG (2 
slight tilting and gripping). In addition, the servomanipulator. 
 Working speeds: 
o Telescopic mas lifting, full load: 0.05m/min to 10m/min 
o Trolley speed: 0.01m/min to 20m/min 
o Crane translation speed: 0.01m/min to 20m/min 
 Weight of the crane: 5-10 Ton 
 Estimation of cost: 1.5M€ - 2M€ 
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   Fig. 49 – CATIA drawing of the ACMC proposed[4] 
 
6.3.4.2. Servomanipulators 
Servomanipulator, called CMS, is the piece of RH equipment to perform the “delicate” and 
accurate operations on the components in the TC and in the AC, mostly connection and 
disconnection of flanges, pipes and cables in the TMs and other RH operations for the TA. 
Also some transportation operations on light components can be performed by the 
servomanipulators.  
As previously stated, this component will be fixed on a telescopic mast of the ACMC in the 
present configuration and it is foreseen that a MG will be attached to the bottom of the pole 
in order to grasp, transport, install and remove the TMs and other components weighting 
less than 1 Ton. 
I. Combined manipulator system (CMS) 
CMS is a rad-hard force-reflecting master-slave servomanipulator. 
 Degrees of freedom: 6 + gripper 
 Load capacity: 100 kg at full extension of arm and continuous work. 
 Working speed: Speed of gripper <0.1mm/s to 0.5m/s 
 Estimation of cost: 1.1M€ 
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Fig. 50 – CMS attached to the ACMC crane[4] 
 
II. Mast Grapple (MG) 
MG is a rad-hard joint and gripper. 
 Degrees of freedom: 2 + gripper 
 Load capacity: 1 Ton 
 Working speeds:  
o Rotation: ~0 to 0.25 rpm 
o Slight wrist pan and tilt: <0.05º/s 
 Estimation of cost: ~0.1 - 0.2 M€ 
 
Fig. 51 – MG attached to the bottom of the Telescopic Mast[4] 
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6.3.4.3. Tools 
Tools are instruments or devices held on the RH equipment, particularly on the 
servomanipulators, and used to catch, fasten, lift, or change something. These components 
are required in tasks of cutting, welding, bolting… A preliminary selection of the tools is 
defined below: 
I. Frame spreader 
Frame to grasp, lift and transfer some components of the TC (load capacity 
~3 Ton). Each frame shall be used to lift and transfer the respective 
component or a similar size component. 
 
Fig. 52 – Frame spreader layout[4] 
 
II. Large Bolting Wrench 
Bolt or unbolt the large bolts; for example those are in the vessel covers or, 
perhaps, one big central bolt can be used for the electrical multiconnectors at 
top of the TMIH too. It would have a length <~400mm and a torque up to 
10000 N·m. 
 
Fig. 53 – Modified-commercial pneumatic bolting wrench[4] 
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III. Small Bolting Wrench 
Bolt and unbolt pipe flange bolts, electrical connectors, quick disconnection 
system… It’s important in TMs and target assembly removal. Two types of 
bolting wrenches are needed, one for the bolts having good access, usually 
vertical axis bolts, and angular bolting tool for bolts without wide access. 
They have a weight of ~20kg and a length of 400mm. 
    
Fig. 54 – LEFT: Direct Small Bolting Tool and RIGHT: Angular Small Bolting Tool[4] 
 
IV. Universal Cutting Tool 
It will be a cutting laser or equivalent proper means, supported on a gripping 
interface, probably the MG. This instrument will cut the lower and upper part 
of the HFTM container, pipes, cables… 
  
Fig. 55 – Universal cutting tool LEFT: commercial model and RIGHT: drawing[4] 
 
V. Butt Welding Tool 
This instrument will weld pipes, covers… 
    
Fig. 56 – Butt welding tool LEFT: commercial model and RIGHT: drawing[4] 
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VI. Welding tool for straight weldings 
This instrument will weld the HFTM container with HFTM attachment adapter 
and the HFTM Attachment Adapter with the TMIH. 
 
6.3.4.4. Auxiliary tools 
Auxiliary Tools are defined as elements that contribute to the RH operations but they are not 
exactly neither tools nor equipment. They are classified in four categories: 
 Tool Box(es): A tool box is a tray to allow transportation of certain set of tools 
planned to perform certain defined series of operations at the same location. For 
example a tool box may contain the tools for (dis)connection/unbolt the multi 
connectors at top of the TMs. The Tool Box should have a Lifting Interface 
compatible with the equipment in charge of its transportation. 
 Specimen Container(s): for irradiated modules or other components. These 
instruments were common in a former design when there were transporters. The 
transporters were pieces of equipment in the test facilities of IFMIF aimed for the 
onfloor transfer of components between rooms. In the current design, perhaps just 
one transporter and TM containers will be used; however, this concept is constantly 
updated and they does not appear in this project. 
 
Fig. 57 – Old design of a TM transporter and container[4] 
 
 HFTM Shielded Support Mechanism: It’s the support where the HFTM will be 
disassembled. 
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Fig. 58 – HFTM Shielded Support Mechanism[4] 
 
 AC Tool Box Storage Shelf and TMHC Tool Box Storage Shelf 
  
Fig. 59 – LEFT: AC tool box storage shelf and RIGHT: TMHC tool box storage shelf[4] 
 
6.3.4.5. Viewing and illumination systems 
Viewing and illumination has to be totally integrated with the building layout, the 
requirements of the RH equipment and tools, the shadows and vision barriers from the 
components, accessibility, (dis)assembling procedures, the degree of visual detail required 
for the particular procedure, and the supports in the building for the cameras and 
illumination. 
Two top systems of viewing and illumination have been proposed: 
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I. Access Cell viewing and illumination system 
It is composed of the HROC and ACMC crane-mounted viewing and 
illumination system: aimed for vision of the particular area where the HROC 
or ACMC are working on; and the AC wall-fixed viewing and illumination 
system, intended for general view of the working area with independence of 
the location of the cranes. 
 
   
Fig. 60 – LEFT: position of some of the cameras in the ACMC and RIGHT: position of the cameras in the AC[4] 
 
II. Portable viewing and illumination system 
Composed of easily movable cameras and lights located on supports that 
can be grasped by the servomanipulators for transport and location where 
needed. One application of the Portable Cameras is the viewing and 
illumination of the operations inside the Test Cell. The location of the 
Portable Cameras must be planned and predefined before performing the 
operations. The Portable Cameras shall have a gripping interface (different 
from the attachment camera-floor fitting) to allow grasping of the camera by 
the servomanipulator. 
 
Fig. 61 – Portable viewing and illumination system concept[4] 
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6.3.5. RH RAMI requirements 
The RH systems are conceived and designed to fulfill the plant availability according to the 
RAMI studies but it must be checked. The first approach was shown in the DDD-II phase, in 
the Test facility RAMI Report [21]. All the same, new results have been obtained by this 
research project including the HRA and they will be integrated into the design for DDD-III 
phase. 
Two types of RAMI analyses are being performed for the RH systems regarding: 
 RH activities during scheduled maintenance plan: a long annual maintenance period 
of 20 days that should not affect the overall availability of IFMIF. The main RH 
operations involved are the removal of the TA and the irradiated TMs from the TC, 
the installation of the new TMs and the new or refurbished Target Assembly, and 
also other preventive maintenance tasks in the TC (inspection, cables, pipes, 
instrumentation, etc.). In addition, the TCCP, the TSP and the LSP have to be 
removed and installed too. This analysis has been developed using the RH FMECA 
which is described below. The availability allocation for the long maintenance period 
is not determinate exactly but must be one so that the RH activities are achieved 
within the expected time (480 h) [21]. 
 RH activities during irradiation: failure inside the TC that makes stop the plant and 
leads to curative maintenance operations inside the TC. The RAMI analysis consists 
on the study of main curative maintenance scenarios: 
 115h to replace a module 
 160h to replace the TA 
 504h to replace a PCP 
The availability allocation for these curative interventions is 99.1%. 
In summary and as with all IFMIF facilities, RH equipment must be designed for high 
reliability because downtime and MTTR of the RH system implies a loss of irradiation time in 
this factory of neutrons.  
6.3.6. First RH FMECA 
A preliminary RH RAMI FMECA was performed to study the possible failures of the RH 
systems and the consequences. Based on this initial step, a new FMECA has been 
developed that includes the human factor (with the HFEs and their associated failure rates) 
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and the components failure rates. The Appendix A shows this final FMECA model which 
has been deployed to carry out the availability analysis for the cases described in the 
previous section. 
Nonetheless, the following list is a brief explanation about the significant aspects which 
shape this first RH FMECA and it has remained unchanged throughout the process. 
 Components: the RH FMECA is divided in the components to be manipulated: 
TCCP, TSP, LSP, PCPs, TMs and TA 
 Tasks: the activities carried out by the RH system for each component; liftings, 
releasings, horizontal movements, weldings, connections… 
 Potential failure modes and their causes: they are the most important aspect in 
these analyses since it is the troubleshooting step.  
 Effects: consequences of the potential failure modes 
 Scenarios and times: there are the best possible scenario and the worst for each 
potential failure mode and they have an associated downtime depending on the 
refurbishment of the effects. These downtimes are estimated using Events which 
are the activities and tasks that solve the failure. Scenarios and Events are 
described in the following tables. Some values have changed and are updated in the 
final FMECA (Appendix A). 
Table 2 – RH Failure Scenarios 
 
Scenario Description/Justification downtime 
(h) 
1 Drop of TA in AC (1) Without rupture of piping/elements inside AC 60 
2 Drop of TA in AC (2) With rupture of piping/elements inside AC 564 
3 Drop of TA in TC (1) Without modules inside the TC 60 
4 Drop of TA in TC (2) With modules inside the TC 2220 
5 Drop of module in AC (1) Without rupture of piping/elements inside AC 60 
6 Drop of module in AC (2) With rupture of piping/elements inside AC 564 
7 Drop of module in TC (1) With modules inside the TC 2220 
8 Drop of TC cover in AC (1) Without rupture of piping/elements inside AC 336 
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9 Drop of TC cover in AC (2) With rupture of piping/elements inside AC 504 
10 Drop of TC cover in TC With rupture of TSP  130 
11 Drop of TSP in AC (1) Without rupture of piping/elements inside AC 130 
12 Drop of TSP in AC (2) With rupture of piping/elements inside AC 802 
13 Drop of TSP in TC With rupture of LSP 526 
14 Drop of LSP or PCP in AC (1) Without rupture of piping/elements inside AC 526 
15 Drop of LSP or PCP in AC (2) With rupture of piping/elements inside AC 862 
16 Drop of LSP or PCP in TC With rupture of all piping, modules and TA 2182 
17 Heavy Crane curative maintenance (1)  minor maintenance (no rescue) 22 
18 
Heavy Crane curative maintenance (2) 
AC Major maintenance (with rescue) 46 
19 
Heavy Crane curative maintenance (3) 
TC Major maintenance (with rescue) 70 
20 Small Crane curative maintenance (1)  Minor maintenance 22 
21 Small Crane curative maintenance (2) AC Major maintenance 46 
22 Small Crane curative maintenance (2) TC Major maintenance 70 
23 AC curative maintenance (1) Only repair 17 
24 AC curative maintenance (2) Repair + cleaning 353 
25 TC curative maintenance (1) Only repair 22 
26 TC curative maintenance (2) Repair + cleaning 521 
27 Arm robot curative maintenance (1) Safety position and replacement of device 14 
28 Arm robot curative maintenance (2) 
Safety position and major maintenance 
(rescue from TC) 62 
29 Arm robot rescue in AC location (worst in AC) 36 
30 Arm robot rescue in TC location (worst in TC) 60 
31 Reload of TA and modules Full long maintenance period 480 
32 
Removal of an element in Worst Place 
AC Rescue of an element fallen from the RH AC 5 
33 Removal of an element in Worst place TC Rescue of an element fallen from the RH TC 10 
Human reliability assessment in remote handling tasks as a contribution to RAMI reviews of IFMIF Page 59 
 
 
Table 3 – RH Failure Events 
 
 
 Components directly involved: it refers to the components that can be damaged 
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Fig. 62 – Part of the first RH FMECA 
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7. Human reliability assessment 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The perception that human factor could have a significant influence on the maintenance 
tasks performed by the RH system appears on the run up to RH FMECA design focused on 
downtime rather than safety. This importance has been highlighted in other safety analyses 
such as Applying HAZOP analysis in assessing remote handling compatibility of ITER port 
plugs [22], involving RH activities in the fusion framework. However, it has been never 
quantified. So, it was necessary to devise a new tool to estimate how the human action 
affects these maintenance tasks and the global downtime of the facility. 
The previous labor to the method elaboration consists of an analysis of the existing 
documentation concerning human reliability which was found during a researching period of 
three weeks. Among these relevant documents some of them must be cited: Análisis de los 
efectos del entrenamiento en simulador sobre la fiabilidad humana [23]; Best practice guide 
contemporary state of the scientific knowledge about human factors and labour safety in 
Slovakia [24]; Framework for human error quantification [25]; Human reliability analysis 
methods for probabilistic safety assessment [26]; Determination of human error probabilities 
for offshore platform musters [27]; Reactor safety study: an assessment of accident risks in 
US commercial nuclear power plants [28]; Human errors analysis and safety management 
systems in hazardous activities [29] and Probability of failure of the TRUDOCK crane 
system at the waste isolation pilot plant (WIPP) [30].  
All the same, the preceding reports were used to gain a first approach and to get 
acquainted with this field and the tools usually applied. The HRA sources really studied and 
used to perform and validate the method will be properly referenced below when the 
technique is described. 
7.2. Methods to estimate the human error probability 
First and foremost, a brief overview of every tool looked up and applied is submitted.  
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7.2.1. THERP 
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction, THERP, is the human reliability 
methodology most commonly employed and the oldest one. It was described in the NUREG 
CR/1278 [5]. The THERP steps are like the phases used in the conventional reliability 
analysis where human tasks replace the mechanical components of the equipment. 
In addition, these human tasks and their associated failures called Human Failure Event 
(HFE) have to be broken down into basic activities called Unsafe Actions (UAs) in this case. 
The Human Error Probability (HEP) can be estimated using assumptions for every of these 
UAs. Consequently, HEPs allow to obtain a failure probability for every HFE by means of a 
event tree (ET). 
In these ETs, branches start from the bifurcation points and these bifurcation points are the 
UAs and whether or not the RH operators successfully perform the tasks the probability is 
divided as seen in the next figure. 
 
 
Fig. 63 – Event Tree diagram[5] 
The THERP is designed to take into account the dependence between consecutive UAs 
and the influence by external factors called Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs). These 
steps will be highlighted below and the values are shown in the appendixes.  
However, this technique only allows estimating the manual failure probability; for this 
reason, it’s necessary to use another method for the cognitive part. 
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7.2.2. SHARP 
The Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure, SHARP [31], is the tool chosen to 
solve the lack of cognitive factor estimation of the previous technique. The SHARP, briefly, 
is the union of THERP and Human Cognitive Reliability model (HCR) which is described by 
the NUS-4531 document [32].  
HCR is based on the premise that an operator’s likelihood of success or failure in a time-
critical task is dependent on the cognitive process used to make the critical decisions that 
determine the outcome. As happened with THERP, PSFs also influence the average 
(median) time taken to perform the task. Combining these factors enables “response-time” 
curves to be calibrated and compared to the available time to perform the task. Using these 
curves, the analyst can then estimate the likelihood that an operator will take the correct 
action, as required by a given stimulus within the available time window. The relationship 
between these normalized times and HEPs is based on simulator experimental data and 
depends on the task type: rule-based, skill-based, and knowledge-based. 
In conclusion, SHARP is the starting point of the methodology used and it will be discussed 
further in the next section. SHARP shows that the final HEP associated to every HFE will be 
estimated as seen in the following figure and equation. 
 
Fig. 64 – SHARP’s Operator behavior model 
 
 
manualcogcog FPFPFPHEPtotal  )1(  (Eq.  7.1) 
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7.2.3. ATHEANA 
This method is briefly explained because it will probably be the most employed in the 
nuclear field as is designed to be included in Probability Safety/Risk Assessments 
(PSAs/PRAs).  
ATHEANA is a post-incident Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) methodology developed 
by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2000[33]. It was developed in the hope that 
certain types of human behavior in nuclear plants and industries, which use similar 
processes, could be represented in a way in which they could be more easily understood. It 
seeks to provide a robust psychological framework to evaluate and identify PSFs including 
organizational/environmental factors which have driven incidents involving human factors, 
primarily with the intention of suggesting process improvement. Essentially, it is a method of 
representing complex accident reports within a standardized structure, which may be easier 
to understand and communicate. 
This tool split up HFEs into basic activities called Unsafe Action (UAs) as the methodology 
designed and explained below. However, ATHEANA is not been used in this project since it 
needs the expert judgment to estimate HEPs.  
 
Fig. 65 – Steps in the ATHEANA methodology[33] 
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7.3. Selection and description of the methodology 
This section describes in detail the methodology developed by the FEEL team to estimate 
HEPs and their associated failure rates, so as to merge HRA and RAMI analysis. 
1. Identify HFEs 
First and foremost, there was a selection of the Failure Modes from the first RH FMECA 
described above which have a partial or total cause in the human factor. So, it was crucial to 
create a HFE database (THERP terminology) which explains all these possible human 
causes. The final FMECA is shown in the appendix A and the HFEs are described in the 
appendix E. It is noteworthy that these HFEs must to be general and they have to allow its 
implementation in any component. 
2. Deploy HFEs ETs 
As defined in THERP and ATHEANA, every HFE is made up of different tasks called UAs. 
This strategy simulates the reliability analysis of technological equipment and facilities which 
are broken up into components. Consequently HFEs can be shown as ETs where every 
bifurcation is an UA with their HEP associated. Branches pointing toward left mean that the 
task (UA) is performed successfully while if branches pointing toward right, the human 
makes an error. Thus, the architecture of the HFE ET describes the procedures and the 
operator behavior while performing safely. This performance is supposed to follow the 
INPO’s (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) Human Performance Tool Box [34] [35]. 
This tactic is called STAR (Stop, Think, act and review) and it is mainly formed by 14 tools 
described below: 
1) Pre Job Briefing: is a human performance tool that allows the worker to think 
through a job and use his/her knowledge to make the job as safe and efficient as 
possible. Workers actually involved with performing the work should prepare and 
lead pre-job briefs. A supervisor or foreman should be present during verbal 
briefings for low hazard jobs to ensure that briefing standards are met. A supervisor 
or manager shall be present during documented pre-job briefings for high hazard 
jobs to ensure that high standards are maintained during the briefing. In this project, 
the Pre Job Briefing has been taken into consideration in the cognitive part human 
error estimation.  
2) Two Minute Rule: Recognizing abnormal conditions and identifying safety hazards is 
the first step to error-free and event-free performance. This tool has been taken into 
consideration in the cognitive part human error estimation, too. 
Page 66  Report 
    
3) Three Way Communication: Mutual understanding is essential to plant operation 
and maintenance. Therefore, responsibility for proper communication is assigned to 
the originator or sender, who must verify the receiver understands the message as 
intended. Each message that is directive in nature must use three-way 
communication and begins when (1st) the sender gets the attention of the intended 
receiver, using the person’s name, and speaks the message. Then (2nd), the 
receiver repeats the message in a paraphrased form, which helps the sender verify 
that the receiver understands the intended message. Finally (3rd), the sender 
acknowledges that the receiver heard and understood the message. The third leg of 
the communication is often the weak link, since the sender is tempted to not pay 
attention to the receiver’s statement, assuming the person heard their message. If 
the receiver does not receive acknowledgment from the sender, he/she should be 
assertive, and ask the sender to complete the third leg. Feedback is necessary to 
verify understanding of each spoken message. This strategy appears in some UAs 
with regard to communication task, between the operator and controllers, and it 
affects their HEP. 
4) Phonetic Alphabet: When the only distinguishing difference between two component 
designators is a single letter, then the phonetic alphabet form of the letter should be 
substituted for the distinguishing character (A: Alpha, B: Bravo, C: Charlie…). This 
tool is not considered significant in this project. 
5) Procedure Use and Adherence: Procedures help users to perform activities 
correctly, safely, consistently, and in accordance with design requirements. 
Procedures direct people’s actions in a proper sequence and minimize reliance on 
one’s memory and the choices made in the field. When workers are forced to 
interpret a procedure's use and applicability, the chance for error is increased. 
Procedure use specifies the minimum required reference to the procedure during 
the performance of a task, such as continuous use (in-hand), reference use, and 
information use. Procedure adherence means following the intent and direction 
provided in the procedure regardless of the level of use. These steps have been 
regarded in PSFs deployment.  
6) Place Keeping: Place keeping is used to mark the steps in a procedure or work 
document that have been completed or that are not applicable, so that steps are not 
accidentally omitted or repeated. This tool has been taken into account in all the 
checking tasks which appears in the ETs. 
7) Flagging and Operational Barriers: Flagging involves highlighting a component in 
such a way to improve the chances of performing actions on the correct component. 
Operational Barriers are used to mark or cover components that are not to be 
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worked or manipulated during an evolution. Flagging & Operational Barriers are 
particularly helpful when there are several similar components in close proximity to 
those affected by the work activity. Several events have been attributed to an 
individual starting an activity on one component, taking a break or becoming 
otherwise distracted from the component, then performing manipulations on the 
wrong component. This tool has been taken into consideration in HEP allocation for 
UAs like “Selection of the tool”. 
8) Touch STAR: Self-checking helps prevent errors when ‘touching’ plant equipment to 
change its status or even when revising a document important for plant safety and 
reliability. Self-checking is particularly effective during skill-based tasks that could be 
performed without much conscious thought. This technique helps boosts attention at 
important points in an activity before an important action is performed. If attention is 
not focused, error is likely. Self-checking is constant, there are a large number of 
UAs of self-checking. 
9) Independent Verification: Independent verification is the act of verifying the condition 
of a component, system, or document, etc., independent from the original act that 
placed it in that condition, to find errors by the performer. It is an act of checking a 
component's or product’s status or quality independent of the person that 
established its present state. True independence requires separation in time and 
space between the individuals involved to ensure ‘freedom of thought’. There are a 
great number of UAs of checking carried out by the controllers in this project. 
10) Concurrent Verification: Concurrent Verification is used to prevent an error by the 
worker when changing the condition or status of a component. Concurrent 
verification focuses on the proper "verification" of the correct device, the expected 
operation, and the abilities of the person making the verification. Concurrent 
verification is intended to address every aspect of the task before any manipulation 
of the device is made. As already discussed in the preceding tool, there are different 
UAs of checking for every HFE FT. 
11) First Check: First Check can be thought of as a remote peer check and is used to 
ensure the first component manipulation for a specific task is performed on the 
proper unit / channel / component. Simply put, First Check is used to validate you 
are in the right place before you begin working alone. It appears in the first UA of 
every HFE. 
12) Stop when Unsure: When confronted with a situation that creates a question, a 
person is in uncharted (unfamiliar) territory, a knowledge-based performance 
situation. Whenever a question is encountered and what to do about it is uncertain, 
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stop and get help. Given the chances for error are particularly high in a knowledge-
based situation, the best course of action, when unsure, is to take a time-out and get 
another person’s ‘mind’ focused on the problem. For effective problem- solving to 
occur, people must recognize they are in a knowledge-based situation. This tool is 
related to task stopping UAs when the operator or controllers realize the error.  
13) Peer-Checking: Peer checking is an error-prevention technique involving a verbal 
agreement between two individuals prior to a specific action and/or task, such that 
one will observe or check the behavior of the other to prevent an error by the 
performer. Once again, this step has been taken into consideration in checking UAs 
carried out by controllers and communication UAs. 
14) Post-Job Review: Post-job reviews give employees that were involved in the work 
activity to provide feedback. A post-job review is conducted for high hazard jobs to 
determine if planning and briefings were effective. 
As with HFEs, the UAs must to be general and they have to allow its implementation in any 
HFE ET. They are described in the appendix F. On the other hand, every FT has its own 
assumptions and they are shown in the appendix G. 
3. Deploy PSFs 
HEPs data that can be used in human reliability analysis and obtained from NUREG/CR-
1278 [5] are nominal values. Nominal HEP is the probability of a given human error when 
the effects of PSFs have not been considered. In order to yield more realistic human 
reliability analysis, the nominal HEPs of task elements must be modified according to the 
task situation. This modification will be described later because this section defines PSFs 
selection and importance “quantification”. The method follows the strategy shown in the 
NUREG/CR-1278 [5] and the journal Considering performance shaping factors in situation-
specific human error probabilities [36].  
In general, human behavior is affected by many factors such as adaptability, flexibility or 
task environment. These influences are called PSF. The base of nominal HEP modification 
is as follows: if the PSFs are very favorable, then the basic HEP would be determined by 
selecting the lower uncertainty bound of the HEP; or conversely, if the PSFs are very 
unfavorable, the upper uncertainty bound. The first step is to select relevant PSFs to be 
used in the modification of a nominal HEP. It is not possible to model all the effects of PSFs 
either in general or in their applications to a specific task situation. Some PSFs are more 
important than others in their influence on human error for a task to be analyzed. The initial 
consideration of PSFs should be a screening to reduce the number of possible PSFs to a 
practical number. 
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The 'quality' (%i) of a PSF represents how much adequately the condition of the PSF was 
designed for the performance of a task. The condition of a PSF is rated in a quality 
percentile score. The quality percentile score of a PSF in a specific task situation represents 
the percentage of all other situations (i.e., situation population) with better quality level, 
probably judged from experience or actual survey. Favorable PSFs are associated with low 
(good) percentile scores. For example, if the quality percentile score of 'information load' in 
a specific situation is 15%, it means that only 15% of all other situations have lower (better) 
score exceeding the quality level of the situation at hand. 
The ‘relative importance weights’ (wi) of PSFs are used to compute a composite quality 
score from the quality scores of PSFs. The relative importance weights of PSFs have values 
in the range [0, 1] and they sum to one. The weights have to be determined from expert 
opinions. 
The PSFs, quality values and relative importance weights used are shown and described in 
the appendix I. The composite quality score (% = ∑Wi·%i) will be used to adjust the nominal 
HEP as will be explained below. 
4. THERP calculation: manual failure probability FPM 
To begin with, it was necessary allocate HEPs for every UA using the NUREG-1278 [5] and 
[25] in some case. These values are shown in the appendix F, in the HEPn column together 
with their error factor (EF). The assumptions which explain the HEPn selection and the 
source used are shown in the next columns. 
To estimate the FPM, the HEPn have to be modified since they are affected for the PSFs 
and the dependence between consecutive UAs. If the operator missed to performance 
some task, the failure in the next one would be more likely depending on similarity and 
physical/timely proximity between both actions. The dependencies between consecutive 
UA’s have been divided into 3 categories as explained in the THERP methodology [5]: 
 Low dependency:  
 







  (Eq.  7.2) 
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 High dependency: 
 
The type of dependence used for every UA in every HFE is shown in the appendix G. 
However, the PSF modification has to be applied before to estimate the FPM. This 
adjustment is assessed using the following equation [36]:  
 
Being: 
  ≡ the log-median 
 
  ≡ the log-standard distribution 
 
 ≡ the standard manual accumulative distribution fraction 
 
 % ≡ the composite quality score 
 
 LUB and UUB, lower and upper bond respectively that are calculated with the 
associated EF found in [NUREG1278] [5]. 
 
These HEPbasic values are used to estimate the PFM for every HFE, which is shown in the 



















































Basic eHEP                  (Eq.  7.5) 
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5. HCR calculation: cognitive failure probability FPC 
As mentioned above, this estimation has been developed using the method explained in the 
NUS-4531 [32] and which is applied to HRA in China: Model and data [37] and Desarrollo 
del Análisis Probabilista de Seguridad (APS) de la piscina de combustible gastado de una 
central nuclear de agua a presión [38].  
HCR is a time-dependent model to be used in human cognitive processing reliability. Two 
hypotheses are made in it. The first is that all behavior types of human actions can be 
classified into skill type, rule type and knowledge type. The second is that the probability of 
every behavior error is only related to the proportion of permitted time to execution time 
(td/t1/2) and is distributed by a Weibull distribution: 
α, β, ɣ are the behavior type parameters of the RH operator and their values are procured 
from the Weibull distribution factors of HCR model table (NUS-4531) [32]: 
Table 4 – Weibull distribution parameters depending on behavior type[37][32] 
 
 
At this juncture, it is important to highlight the times used and which appears in the appendix 
H: 
 td1 ≡ time available (nominal): maximum time, in minutes, allowed in which the task 
must be performed. It was calculated dividing all the actions carried out by operators 
into: move horizontally, move vertically, attachment, 
cutting/welding/bolting/unbolting, connection/disconnections and change tool; and 
obtaining a “mean time available” for each one of them. The times associated with 
each activity are in the appendix D. 
 tmnom ≡ manual action time (nominal):  time, in minutes, estimated to carry out the 
task. As in the previous case, it was calculated dividing all the actions carried out by 
operators into: move horizontally, move vertically, attachment, 
cutting/welding/bolting/unbolting, connection/disconnections and change tool; and 


















eFPc  (Eq.  7.6) 
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obtaining a “mean action time” for each one of them. The current assumption is that 
the td1 is twice tmnom. 
 t1/2nom ≡ detection and diagnosis time (nominal): this time, in minutes, is based in the 
STAR tools: Pre Job Briefing and Two Minute Rule. The normal value is 3 minutes; 
however, 10 minutes has been taken in some critical tasks.  
 tmbasic ≡ manual action time (basic):  time, in minutes, estimated to carry out the task 
altered by the new HCR PSFs (k1, k2, k3). The equation and the parameters 
values[32] are: 
Table 5 – HCR PSFs values[37][32] 
 
 
The k1, k2, k3 values used appear in the appendix H. 
 
 t1/2basic ≡ detection and diagnosis time (basic): time, in minutes, for briefing and 
thinking altered by the new HCR PSFs (k1, k2, k3). This value is used in the equation 
7.6. 
 td2 ≡ time available (basic): this time, in minutes, is determined by the equation 7.9 
and used in the equation 7.6: 
   )1()1()1( 321 kkktt mnommbasic   (Eq.  7.7) 
   )1()1()1( 3212/12/1 kkktt nombasic   (Eq.  7.8) 
   basicmbasicdd tttt 2/112   (Eq.  7.9) 
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FPCs are in the appendix H (Weibull distribution column).  
6. Probability calculation merging the two methodologies 
The equation that links together the “action” calculations (THERP methodology) and the 
cognitive calculations (HCR methodology) and develops the final probability is shown in the 
SHARP methodology [31]: 
In all the cases, the final HEPtotal are being strongly influenced by the “action” calculation 
from the THERP methodology. It is not an emergency scenario analysis where de cognitive 
part is highly important due to the short detection/response times.  
So, the final distribution applied to the probability of HFEtotal is a lognormal distribution with 
an EF value from the THERP methodology which will be used in the RAMI analysis.  
7. Failure rate per event working hour calculation 
To adapt these HEPtotals for use in RAMI analysis, it is necessary to associate a failure rate 
for each of them. The first step is to divide these values by the time estimated to carry out 
the task (tm+t1/2; this last one is not relevant because its order of magnitude is much lower 
than the first one’s value). Desired units are failure/hourwork. 
8. Failure rate calculation 
Finally, the values obtained from the previous step will be multiply by total time in which the 
potential failure mode with a HFE could take place. Moreover, it will be divided by the total 
hours in one year; thereby, the units are failure/houryear and they will be used in RAMI 
analysis like a normal component. These final values are shown in the appendix A in the 




MFPFPcFPcHEPtotal  )1(  (Eq.  7.10) 
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7.3.1. Validation of the method in a critical task of IFMIF 
The method described in the previous section had to be validated before it could be used in 
the IFMIF RAMI analyses. To that end, it had not only be properly referenced and procured 
from reliable sources but it had to be submitted to a group of experts as well. 
This event happened on 28
th
 November 2012 during 5th IFMIF Workshop hosted by ENEA 
and INFN in Bologna where the FEEL team successfully submits the results estimated by 





Fig. 66 – Slides used to validate the method in the 5th IFMIF Workshop 
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7.4. Modification of the first FMECA 
Section 6.3.6 described the preliminary RH FMECA which was the starting point to ripen the 
project. Afterwards and at this stage, there is a need to update this first draft to be the guide 
of the sustainable RH FT development shown in the appendix J. Thus, it will be possible 
perform the RAMI analysis that will be easily revisable, clear and comprehensible. 
The following is a brief explanation about the significant aspects which appear in the 
appendix A and improve the previous FMECA design: 
 Cause: explains how the potential failure modes take place. Causes were foreseen 
in the first FMECA however they have been substantially reviewed and modified. 
Causes will be the basic events in the RAMI analysis and some of the most 
commonly set are: limit switches failure, failure in camera element and all HFEs. If 
the potential failure mode has two or more causes, they will share an AND gate 
since the FMECA was designed accepting this assumption. 
 Failure rate: these FMECA’s columns provide the failure frequency of components 
which appear as causes of some potential failure modes. Their units can be: 
[failure/houryear] or [failure/demand]. These values will be the failure rates of their 
associated basic events inside the RAMI analysis.  
 HFE failure rate: they are the values gotten when the methodology, previously 
explained, is applied. As described above, their units are [failure/houryear]. 
 References: the Ref column provides the sources from components failure rates 
have been obtained. Once again it is noteworthy that the FEEL has succeeded 
creating an important failure rate and MTTR database for a large number of 
components used into every IFMIF facility. Consequently, some of these failure rate 
values are referenced to FEEL and their documentation.  
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8. HRA and RAMI merge 
The FMECA approximation is useful for estimating some important issues that the system 
could have. However, it provides no information about other important features of the 
dynamics of the system under study. The FMECA analysis concludes that there will be a 
problem if a failure happens, but cannot give us a clear view of the effect of the whole 
system. 
An approximate probabilistic analysis which captures these and certain other important 
aspects of the system which cannot be obtained from a FMECA analysis has been 
formulated. [7]  
This analysis will be a first milestone in IFMIF RAMI assays since it is the first that contains 
the human factor. This stage describes the breakdown of the probabilistic simulation into the 
different cases, the improvements drawn from them and the final conclusions.  
8.1. RiskSpectrum® 
RiskSpectrum® (developed by Scandpower which is a member of the Lloyd's Register 
Group) is a tool specifically conceived to make PRAs/PSAs, widely used in nuclear power 
plant industry. So it has good capabilities to cope with similar studies for a facility like IFMIF. 
It allows a complete organization analysis and presentation of risk and reliability information. 
It is a powerful analysis tool that helps to analyze complex models in a few moments and 
calculate availability measures by using Boolean combination of failures modes. 
8.2. Codification 
Once the FMECA (Annex A) has been developed, the failure modes have been deployed in 
the implementation of a FT in RiskSpectrum® software (Annex J). This FT analysis consist 
of basic events, failures modes, unified with gates to structure the systems and to perform a 
simulation of the modeled design. The current model has around 428 Basic Events (Annex 
K). 
An eleven characters word codification has been used to describe, the information about 
different aspects of the Basic Event. The codification designed by FEEL is: 
Table 6 – Basic Event Codification 
S CC F P L R XXX M 
System Component Function Part Location Recovery time Number Failure Mode 
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This encoding is followed for the entire IFMIF facility, not only to the RH FT. A description of 
the characters which are assigned to this code, in RH case, is followed: 
 S (System): The first character is about the facility/system that the Basic Event is at. 
Table 7 – System codification 
System Code 
Remote Handling R 
 CC (Component): These characters are about the RH equipment which is affected 
in the Basic Event. 
Table 8 – Component Codification 
Component Code 
Heavy Crane HC 




 F (Function): The fourth character describes the function or the element which fails. 
Table 9 – Function Codification 
Function/element Code 
Braking system B 
Camera C 
Defect rope/hook D 
Glass fibre cabling G 
Human H 




Mechanical tool T 
 P (Part): This character says the part of the facility that the studied component is at. 
In RH it is undetermined (X). 
 L (Location): The sixth character says the component which is being manipulated. 
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 R (Recovery Time): This character describes the time that takes to the system to 
recover in the case of a failure in the component. In RH it is undetermined (X). 
 N (Number): These characters symbolize the order when there are some Basic 
Events of the same type and; in the HFEs, the number shows what of them is. 
 M (Failure Mode): In the present RH analysis, this character is always the letter ‘G’ 
of General. 
8.3. Analysis 
The FT analysis searches the achievement of the availability allocation to the RH 
components by means of a probabilistic analysis of the RH most common activities. As 
mentioned above, the availability allocation objective is: 
 The availability allocation for curative interventions is 99.1% during the Test Facility 
operation in the 11 months irradiation.  
 The availability allocation for the long maintenance period is not determinate exactly 
but must be one so that the RH activities are achieved within the expected time (480 
h). [39]  
8.3.1. Assumptions 
Before starting the analysis, some assumptions had to be accepted: 
 The RH operation has been always simulated as continuous. 
 Optimistic scenarios (downtimes) from the RH FMECA are the ones taken into 
account. 
 There are 4 modules and all of them have the same complexity (number of 
feedthroughs, downtimes, operational times…). The reference design has been the 
HFTM.  
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 The HFEs improvements by means of Man Machine Interfaces (MMI) are 
represented as separated events in the FT. The induced error in the branch where 
the MMI would be located is considered assumable.  
 The installation of the component “Test module positioning and supporting structure” 
has not been taken into account in this analysis. 
 
8.3.2. Base Cases 
The FT analysis is focused in 5 base cases. 4 out of 5 base cases describe the most 
common activities the RH is expected to face: 
 The long maintenance case which is described in the maintenance plan consists in 
20 days of downtime per 11 months of irradiation. The replacement of the irradiated 
modules and TA will take place among others in this period. 
 The module and TA replacement curative maintenance. The TA and the irradiated 
modules are the critical components inside the TC. They are expected to be one of 
the most weak in terms of availability. Moreover, the HFTM replacement every 
irradiation campaign has been taken into account when allocating the systems’ 
availability [4] [39]. 
 The PCP replacement curative maintenance. Although it is expected to last all IFMIF 
lifetime, the PCP’s availability behavior is critical and it has been carefully analyzed. 
 The long maintenance case has been analyzed again without the influence of the 
human factor. In other words, the only contributors to unavailability are the failure 
modes only related with components failure or degradation. 
Figure 67 shows the behavior of the unavailability in time of the base cases. That is, the 
probability of having the RH system in a failed state at time ti. First, all of their unavailabilities 
are not stabilized in the simulated time. In other words, the availability in the RH activities is 
strongly influenced by the duration of the RH operative time. Consequently, the shorter the 
RH activity, the better. 
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Fig. 67 – Evolution of the unavailability in the base cases 
Furthermore, there are stronger slopes in the 4 base cases rather than the one belonging to 
the long maintenance without human factor (“480 NO_HRA”). Hence, the HFEs 
implementation inside the FT analysis develops in a powerful contributor to the prevention of 
the availability stabilization in the expected operative time. The main reason to this behavior 
is caused by the variation in the systems repair time and system failure rate. The HFEs 
have a slightly lower failure rate values (median 4E-6h
-1
versus components median 1E-6h
-1
) 
when compared to the components failure rates as shown in figure 68. Hence, the HFEs 
have the 75% of their values lower than 1.6E-5h
-1
 whereas the components third quadrille 
has a 6E-6h
-1 
value. The HFEs also generally introduce to the system scenarios where 
downtime is higher when compared with the ones induced by the components. 
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Fig. 68 – Failure rates (h-1) used in the analysis 
 
As seen in Eq. 8.1 and Eq. 8.2, the implementation of lower failure rates and higher repair 
times increases the addition (λ + μ). Hence the stabilization time is also increased. 
Furthermore, the long-term unavailability is increased, too. 
 
Being:  
Q(t), the unavailability at time t 
Q( , the long-term unavailability 
, the systems failure rate (h
-1
) 
, (systems repair time)
-1
 
   




 11)(  (Eq.  8.1) 




)(Q    (Eq.  8.2) 
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8.3.2.1. Long maintenance case, 20 days of operation 
This FT analysis case describes the activities during the long maintenance shutdown 
programmed every eleven months of operation. The shutdown is expected to last up to 20 
days (480h). The removals of the TA and the 4 modules have been simulated. 
The mean availability during the 480h of operation has been 80.5%. The minimum 
availability at the end of the period was 72.6% with a 90% confidence interval of [44.1%, 
77.8%] in the long term. The unavailability increases strongly with operation time.  
This availability values are not in consonance with the expected duration range of the long 
shutdown as the 20 days. If we consider the mean availability (80.5%), the 480h would 
develop into 574h. However, the expected minimum time to develop all activities during the 
long maintenance plan is 347h (see FMECA, Annex A).  As a consequence, the application 
of the mean availability would develop into a 414h (less than proposed 480h) but when 
applying the 90% confidence interval in the availability value at the end of the simulation the 
result is [424h,540h]. Nevertheless, an improvement in the RH design would be desirable. 
The first 15 most important basic events are related with the human error in the RH 
operations (HFE’s) and their importance is more than the 50% contribution (52.4%) to the 
total unavailability. The most significant families of events in order of importance are: the 
HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” for modules and TA, 
the HFE-6 “Ledging of item” for TSP and LSP and HFE-16 “Unintentional movement of the 
CMS” for the modules. The 3 families have high failure rates >10E-5h
-1
.  Nevertheless, the 
first not human related event appears until the 16 position in importance (1.14%): 
“RHCDXLX001G” (Drop of load due to cable/hook failure) while moving the LSP. 
 
Table 11 – Basic Events Importance and Sensibility Analysis of the long maintenance case 
 
Being the most important columns: 
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 fv ≡ fusel-vessely importance is the ratio between the unavailability according to for 
all the Minimal Cut Sets not containing the basic event and the nominal top event 
unavailability. 
 nv ≡ normal value 
 fc ≡ fractional contribution to the unavailability (used in the parameter analysis) 
 RDF ≡ risk decrease factor 
 RDI ≡ risk increase factor 
 Sensitivity  
 
The parametric analysis of figure 69 shows low sensitivity influence in all parameters as 
they are all below the coherence line: y=10x+1 (proportional reference between sensitivity 
and importance inside RiskSpectrum®) [40]. 
 
Fig. 69 – Parametric analysis of the long maintenance case 
There are 4 MTTRs out of the 5 most important parameters of the simulation and their 
importance is more than the 50% contribution (66.9%); most of them describe drop of load 
scenarios in the AC. They are “DMAWRPA” (Drop of module in AC with rupture of 
piping/elements inside AC), “DLSOPCPACB” (Drop of LSP or TSP or PCP in AC), 
“ARMROBOTCURATIVE_2” (CMS curative maintenance, safety position and major 
maintenance (rescue from TC)) and “DROPMOTAAC_2” (Drop of module or TA in AC with 
rupture of piping/elements inside AC). However, these scenarios are considered optimistic 
as explained in the assumptions of section 8.3.1. Thus, there is no possible improvement in 
their value. Besides, a more conservative approach should not develop in strong variations 
as they are below the coherent line. 
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Table 12 – Parametric analysis of importance/sensibility of the long maintenance case 
  
On the other hand, the failure rates behavior have less contribution to unavailability in the 
simulation with the exception of the 30.7% of the HFE-2 in module. A failure rate related to a 
component is not placed until the 7
th
 position in importance. It is the “LCMXXX001” 
(Defective rope or hook in the ACMC while operating with modules). 
8.3.2.2. Module replacement case, 115h of operation 
This FT analysis case describes the activities during a failed module replacement. This 
curative maintenance intervention is believed to have a high probability of occurrence.  
Furthermore, the HFTM availability allocation is 98.45%. This value allows one TC opening 
per campaign in case the HFTM fails and needs a removal, if you consider the time to 
remove a module on 115h plus 10h. 
The mean availability during the 115h of operation has been 96.1%. The minimum 
availability at the end of the period was 88.8% with a 90% confidence interval of [74.2%, 
89.0%] in the long term. The unavailability increases strongly with operation time. 
This availability values are not in consonance with the availability allocation (99.1%) to the 
RH curative interventions expected during the Test Facility operation.  Hence, an 
improvement in the RH design is necessary. 
The first 7 events are related with the human error in the RH operations (HFEs) and their 
importance is more than the 50% contribution (57.8%) to the total unavailability. The most 
important event is the HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” 
for the module with nearly a 20% of the total contribution the unavailability. Moreover, the 
HFE-6 and HFE-16 appears with a high relevance as in the previous case.  
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The behavior of events related with the failure of components without human relation has a 
higher impact in this case.  The “RHCMXLX001G” (Drop of load due to motor/gearbox/shaft 
failure) and the “RHCDXLX001G” (Drop of load due to cable/hook failure) both concerning 
the drops of the LSP contribute more than 5% to the unavailability. 
 
Table 13 – Basic Events Importance and Sensibility Analysis of the module replacement case 
 
The parametric analysis of figure 70 shows low sensitivity influence in all parameters as 
they are all below the coherence line. 
 
Fig. 70 – Parametric analysis of the module and target replacement case 
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Foremost, the figure 70 shows a similar behavior to the figure 69, where the first parameters 
in importance are scenarios about repair times of a drop of load. However, the human 
failure is more important in the module removal operations as the HFE-2 and HFE-6 
contributing a total of 48.2% of the total unavailability. The modules parameters follow the 
same behavior as the target parameters; hence the different activities that are involved in 
these two types of component removal are not as important to the unavailability as the ones 
that are the same. 
 
Table 14 – Parametric analysis of importance/sensibility of the module replacement case 
 
8.3.2.3. Target replacement case, 160h of operation 
This FT analysis case describes the activities during a failed target replacement. The failed 
target replacement together with the module replacement is expected to be the curative 
maintenance interventions with higher probability of occurrence [39]. 
The mean availability during the 160h of operation has been 96.0%. The minimum 
availability at the end of the period was 93.8% with a 90% confidence interval of [90.0%, 
75.5%] in the long term. The unavailability increases strongly with operation time as in the 
module replacement. 
This availability values are not in consonance with the availability allocation (99.1%) to the 
remote handling curative interventions expected during the Test Facility operation. Hence, 
an improvement in the RH design is necessary. 
The target replacement case behaves similar to the modules replacement. The six events 
with more importance are related with the human failure with a total 55.5% of unavailability 
contribution. Just as in the module replacement, the most important event is the HFE-2 
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“Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” for the target with nearly a 
20% of the total contribution the unavailability. 
Table 15 – Basic Events Importance and Sensibility Analysis of the target replacement case 
 
The events with no human failure are as in the module replacement, the “RHCMXLX001G” 
(Drop of load due to motor/gearbox/shaft failure) and the “RHCDXLX001G” (Drop of load 
due to cable/hook failure) both concerning the drop of the LSP contribute more than 5% to 
the unavailability. 
Finally, as said in the previous case, the target parameters follow the same behavior as the 
module parameters. Hence, the different activities that are involved in these 2 types of 
component removal are not as important to the unavailability as the ones that are the same 
for them (e.g. the activities concerning the removal of the LSP). 
Table 16 – Parametric analysis of importance/sensibility of the target replacement case 
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8.3.2.4. PCP replacement case, 504h of operation 
The PCP curative intervention and replacement is subject to controversy. It is a component 
not expected to be removed during the whole IFMIF operational lifetime. Although the new 
TC design assigns critical PCP functions as leak tightness to locations where the influence 
of neutron irradiation is much lower, it is prudent to study the influence of RH in its 
replacement. Moreover, there is a 0.014 probability of damage to the PCP in every module 
removal intervention when applying torque to the connection/disconnection feedthroughs. 
The value drops to 0.008 when the item removed is the TA. If we consider there will be at 
least 20 TA’s removed and 100 modules (80 modules have their expected lifetime and 20 
need curative replacement) removed in IFMIF’s life, the probability of having a failed PCP is 
1.56. Hence, there should be at least one PCP replacement as a result of RH maneuvers 
when connecting and disconnecting feedthroughs. This probability does not take into 
account other damages to the PCP (e.g. due to an impact when an item -module, TA or 
LSP- is dropped). 
The mean availability during the 504h of operation has been 78.7%. The minimum 
availability at the end of the period was 69.7% with a 90% CI of [81.5%, 53.2%] in the long 
term. Therefore, the PCP replacement time should increase around the interval [597h, 
740h] taking into account the confidence interval. The unavailability increases with the 
operation time but not as strongly as in the module or in the target replacements. 
The first 4 events in importance are related with the drop of the modules (HFE-2) necessary 
to begin with the PCP removal and they contribute up to 24% of the total unavailability. 
Furthermore, more than the 35% of the total contribution to unavailability is done while 
manipulating the ACMC or the CMS. The HFE-16 and HFE-13 appear as a strong 
contributor to PCP unavailability, too. Thus, the inadequate connection/disconnection 
maneuvers lead to a higher number of actions where the risk of feedthroughs catastrophic 
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Fig. 71 – Parametric analysis of the PCP replacement intervention 
Figure 71 shows that the most important parameters are related with the activities in the 
ACMC with the exception of the drop of big loads (PCP, LSP or TSP): “DLSOPCPACW” 
(Drop of LSP or PCP in AC with rupture of piping/elements inside AC) and “DLSOPCPACB” 
(Drop of LSP or PCP in AC without rupture of piping/elements inside AC).  
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8.3.2.5. Long curative maintenance case without HRA, 20 days of operation 
The strong importance of the human failure has been highlighted in all base cases 
simulations as a common characteristic. Thus, this simulation takes place in order to 
describe the events describing components failures modes and their main parameters 
without the human factor disturbance. 
The mean availability during the 480h of operation has been 95.2%. The minimum 
availability at the end of the period was 93.4% with a 90% confidence interval of [86.2%, 
97.4%] in the long term. The unavailability increases strongly with operation time.  
This availability values are not in consonance with the expected duration range of the long 
shutdown as the 20 days but they are in the correct direction. If we consider the mean 
availability (93.4%), the 480h would develop into 511h. As explained in the first case, the 
expected minimum time to develop all activities during the long maintenance plan is 347h. 
Therefore, the result is [356h, 395h] when applying the 90% confidence interval in the 
availability value at the end of the simulation. Nevertheless, an improvement in the RH 
design would be desirable as it is not feasible a perfect erase of the human factor in the RH 
activities. 
The importance of events is not characterized by a little group of single events. Hence, all 
events are contributing in a similar way once the human factor has been cleared. Failure 
modes attaining the motor, gearbox or shaft contribute nearly the 17% of the total 
unavailability whereas the limit switches failures in the control systems contribute a 22%. 
The ropes and the hooks failures contribute a 16% since their consequences develop high 
downtimes. However, the top contributor group is the cameras in the visualization system 
(32%). The failure of a single camera develops in a very low downtime as it is not repaired 
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Table 18 – Basic Events Importance and Sensibility Analysis of the long without HRA case 
 
Figure 72 and table 19 reveal two types of parameters in the RH components. The ones 
above the coherence line are parameters that have high sensitive values. Therefore, 
variations in their parameters will develop strong variations in the final unavailability. These 
are the parameters to target first in the improvement implementation. 
 
Fig. 72 – Parametric analysis of the long case without HRA 
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However, the first 2 targeting parameters are not available for improvement. The MTTR 
“ARMROBOTCURATIVE_1” (14h) refers to the downtime for fast maintenance involving the 
CMS (e.g. a camera removal). This parameter is strongly related with the TC length and 
ACMC speed, both of them are fixed. The MTTR “DMAWRPA” (564h) describes the 
scenario where there is a drop of an irradiated module inside the AC takes place. This 
parameter has huge uncertainties but is strongly related with the ability to clean the AC from 
irradiated small pieces. Furthermore, the calculation of the downtime has considered the 
optimistic case scenario of a drop inside the AC not inside the TC. Therefore, this is a fixed 
parameter with no way to be improved in this analysis. 
Table 19 – Parametric analysis of importance/sensibility of the long case without HRA 
 
The next parameter to be targeted for an improvement is “LCMXXX001” which describes 
the failure rate of the motor/gearbox/shaft system in the ACMC. This parameter contributes 
nearly a 28% of the total unavailability. The other parameter to be improved should be the 
“LCDMX001” which describes the failure rate in the components that provide the modules 
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attachment; the ACMCs ropes-hook system. The improvement of this parameter would 
induce the improvement in its related failure rate “LCDTX001” which describes the failure 
rate in the components that provide the target attachment. This 2 failure rates concern the 
ACMC sub-system and they contribute 38% of the total unavailability of the RH activities. 
On the other hand, no information more reliable than the one used in this analysis (general 
failure 5E-6 h
-1
) has been found about the ropes-hook system. Therefore, a serious 
improvement in this sub-system is difficult to expect.  Furthermore, the improvement in the 





 for general failure modes). 
The other secondary targets would be the “HCMXXX001” and “HCMLX001”, which describe 
the failure rate of the motor/gearbox/shaft system in the HROC. However, these 2 
parameters contribute 13% of the total unavailability and they have the same problems as 
described before. 
The “VSCXXX001” is a special parameter. It describes the failure rate of a single camera in 
the visualization system of the RH. It is located in the most important contributor group. 
Moreover, it has a high probability of occurrence (1E-4 h
-1
). However, it develops a low 
sensitive value. For this reason, a very strong effort would be needed in order to decrease 
this parameter importance. Yet, the camera is one of the cheapest elements in the RH 
system. This strong effort in increasing its reliability value could be a redundancy in all 
cameras (2 out of 2) and the cost would not be increased significantly. So, in this case, the 
redundancy strategy is specially recommended.              
8.3.3. Availability Improvement 
The main targeted improvements have been highlighted in the base cases analyses. There 
are 2 types of improvements needed. The ones that reduce human failure in the RH 
operations, and the ones that increase reliability in the RH equipment. 
The reduction of the human failure is implemented by decreasing the influence of the 
following failures. The HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” 
is without any doubt the primary target. The HFE-6 “Ledging of item” for TSP and LSP, the 
HFE-13 “Inadequate connection/disconnection” and the HFE-16 “Unintentional movement of 
the CMS” would be the secondary targets.  
The increase in the reliability of RH equipment has its primary target in the decrease of 
failure rates associated to the ACMC. The parameters “LCMXXX001” and “LCDXMX001” 
which are describing the reliability of the motor/gearbox/shaft system and the components 
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that provide the modules attachment are the primary target. The secondary target is to 
increase reliability in the same way to the HROC.   
8.3.3.1. Improvement on HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect 
attachment of an item” 
The HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” improvement has 
been target as a primary objective. The HFE-2 describes the “Incorrect attachment of an 
item” as an item is not connected suitably. The human error can be produced as a result of 
a wrong position of the remote handling, a weak connection, an error when the operator 
choses the tool and the non-detection of these behaviors. 
 
Fig. 73 – Event tree describing the behavior of the HFE-2 and improvement (UAs in the appendix F) 
Figure 73 shows the operator is continuously checked by the controller in all actions in the 
procedure. The critical UA is the manual action when making physical contact between the 
RH tool and the item to be attached (UA number 21, Appendix F). The possibility of 
increasing reliability by increasing the controls and checks in the attachment procedure is 
difficult if there are no more components added to the RH activities. Furthermore, a 
redundant attachment system in every item would increase the reliability up to the required 
values. However, the lack of space in some items such as the modules TMIH makes this 
improvement difficult to implement. 
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Therefore, the improvement selected to the HFE-2 is the implementation of a 
device/instrumentation in the RH attachment tool or clamp. This Man Machine Interface 
(MMI) cited in NUREG-0554 [20] would have an interlock with alarm in the RH control room 
(UA 13, Appendix F) that would need a check from the operator to continue the operation 
(UA 3, Appendix F) as shown in the red square of figure 73. The reliability of the 
device/instrumentation and its interlock has been supposed as 1E-5 h
-1
 which is a standard 
value in electronic equipment [IAEA-TECDOC-478] [41]. 
Table 20 – Failure rates and confidence intervals associated with the improvement in HFE-2 by item attached 
f.r (h-1) I.C. 5% I.C. 95%
HFE002 in TA 5,74E-05 3,56E-05 1,78E-04
HFE002 in Module 7,66E-05 4,75E-05 2,37E-04
HFE002 in PCP 6,02E-05 3,73E-05 1,87E-04
HFE002 in LSP 2,30E-05 1,43E-05 7,13E-05
HFE002 in TSP 1,64E-05 1,02E-05 5,08E-05
HFE002 in TCCP 1,64E-05 1,02E-05 5,08E-05
HFE002_I in TA 2,19E-05 1,36E-05 6,79E-05
HFE002_I in Module 2,92E-05 4,75E-05 2,37E-04
HFE002_I in PCP 2,19E-05 3,73E-05 1,87E-04
HFE002_I in LSP 8,75E-06 1,43E-05 7,13E-05
HFE002_I in TSP 6,25E-06 1,02E-05 5,08E-05
HFE002_I in TCCP 6,25E-06 1,02E-05 5,08E-05
 
Table 20 shows the improvement in Human factor by item attached with the interlock alarm 
implemented. However, the HFE-2 is now linked to a component failure event which 
strongly increases availability; e.g. the long maintenance case increases its mean 
availability from 80.5% to 86.7% and what is even more important; the HFE-2 parameter 
drops from the 2
nd
 unavailability contributor to the 75
th
 place.   
8.3.3.2. Improvement on HFE-6 “Ledging” 
The improvement on HFE-6 “Ledging” must be implemented in the same direction as in the 
previous case; in other words, the HFE-6 requires an extra device/instrumentation in the RH 
design and an alarm with interlock in the RH control room for the RH operation.  
In this case, the device could be an infrared camera/transmitter attached to the HROC and 
the ACMC. The path the item must move on until it is in its parking place would be 
monitored and if any obstacle appeared, the interlock would actuate stopping the motion 
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and an alarm would sound in the RH control room. Similar systems have been design for 
ITER operation, Conceptual Study on Flexible Guidance and Navigation for ITER Remote 
Handling Transport Casks [42] and A capacitance-based proximity sensor for whole arm 
obstacle avoidance [43], not with infrared cameras but with conventional ones. The reliability 
of the system device/instrumentation and its interlock has been supposed as 1E-4 h
-1
, as it 
is expected that the weaker component in this system would be the camera. 
It seems plausible that the system is implemented for the movements for other items, 
although this improvement was thought for the LSP and TSP horizontal movements in the 
AC. The results of the improvement in the HFE-6s are shown in the next figure. 
Table 21 – Failure rates and confidence intervals associated with the improvement in HFE-6 by item moved horizontally 
f.r (h-1) I.C. 5% I.C. 95%
HFE006 in TA 1,34E-05 1,07E-05 3,22E-05
HFE006 in MO 1,34E-05 1,07E-05 3,22E-05
HFE006 in PCP 1,34E-05 1,07E-05 3,22E-05
HFE006 in LSP 4,01E-05 3,21E-05 9,63E-05
HFE006 in TSP 4,01E-05 3,21E-05 9,63E-05
HFE006 in TCCP 4,01E-05 3,21E-05 9,63E-05
HFE006 in TA 1,95E-06 1,56E-06 4,68E-06
HFE006 in MO 1,95E-06 1,56E-06 4,68E-06
HFE006 in PCP 1,95E-06 1,56E-06 4,68E-06
HFE006 in LSP 5,86E-06 4,69E-06 1,41E-05
HFE006 in TSP 5,86E-06 4,69E-06 1,41E-05
HFE006 in TCCP 5,86E-06 4,69E-06 1,41E-05
 
Table 21 shows the improvement in Human factor by item moved with the interlock alarm 
implemented. Just as the HFE-2 improvement, the HFE-6 is now linked to a component 
failure event which strongly increases availability. For example, the long maintenance case 
increases its mean availability from 86.7% to 88.6%. This result seems weak. However, the 
availability increase highlights when compared to the only availability allocation for the RH 
system:  99.1% during the 11 months irradiation. The section 8.3.2.2 base case availability 
result (module replacement case), 96.1% increases with these improvements to 97.1%, 
clearly in the direction of the 99.1%. Furthermore, the HFE-6 parameter drops to the 74
th
 
place of unavailability contributors list. 
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8.3.3.3. Improvement on HFE-13 “Inadequate connection/disconnection” 
The HFE-13 “Inadequate connection/disconnection” is not a primary target as it is not a 
huge contributor to the RH unavailability. Nevertheless, the possibility of a PCP failure 
because of a feedthrough break during the connection/disconnection process is high as 
seen in PCP replacement case (1.5 PCP failures during IFMIF lifetime). The HFE-13 
describes the action of connecting or disconnecting inadequately and not taking it into 
account until the TC is in an operational state. This human failure is not involved in the 
events that lead to the feedthroughs break directly. However, the HFE-13 increases the 
number of connection/disconnection actions; hence increases the probability of occurrence 
of a PCP’s catastrophic feedthrough failure. 
   
Fig. 74 – Event tree describing the behavior of the HFE-13 and improvement (UAs in the appendix F) 
The improvement on HFE-13 must be implemented in the same direction as in the section 
8.3.3.1, too. The HFE-13 event tree is similar to the HFE-2 as they both represent a chain of 
safe-unsafe actions that describe a human manual action (connect a tube or drop an item). 
Still, the HFE-13 has already a check action (UA 11, Appendix F) just after failing the UA 21 
as shown in figure 74. The reason for this “barrier” relays on the HFE-13 repetitive 
occurrence. That is to say, the connection and disconnection requires a check by the 
controller as it is an action done many times in the same period; otherwise, the probability of 
failure would be strongly higher. 
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As a consequence, the HFE-13 requires an extra sensor/instrumentation in the RH design 
and an alarm with interlock in the RH control room for the RH operation. This alarm and 
interlock would activate when the connection or disconnection process is not entirely 
achieved. Just as in section 8.3.3.1, the failure rate of the sensor/instrumentation and its 
interlock has been supposed as 1E-5 h
-1
 which is a standard value in electronic equipment 
[IAEA-TECDOC-478] [41]. 
Table 22 – Failure rates and confidence intervals associated with the improvement in HFE-6 by item dis/connected 
f.r (h-1) I.C. 5% I.C. 95%
HFE013 in TA 1,58E-06 1,26E-06 3,79E-06
HFE013 in MO 6,94E-05 5,55E-05 1,67E-04
HFE013 in PCP 3,79E-05 3,03E-05 9,10E-05
HFE013 in LSP 6,31E-06 5,05E-06 1,51E-05
HFE013 in TA 8,74E-07 6,99E-07 2,10E-06
HFE013 in MO 3,84E-05 3,07E-05 9,22E-05
HFE013 in PCP 2,10E-05 1,68E-05 5,04E-05
HFE013 in LSP 3,49E-06 2,79E-06 8,38E-06
 
Table 22 shows the improvement in human factor by item connected/disconnected with the 
interlock alarm implemented. Just as the HFE-2 improvement, the HFE-13 is now linked to a 
component failure event which strongly increases availability. If all improvements made so 
far are compared, the long maintenance case increases its mean availability from 88.6% to 
91.3%. The section 8.3.2.2 base case availability result, 96.1% increases with these 
improvements to 97.9%. Furthermore, the HFE-13 parameter drops to the 159
th
 place of 
unavailability contributors list.  
8.3.3.4. Improvement on HFE-16 “Unintentional movement of the CMS” 
The improvement on the HFE-16 “Unintentional movement of the CMS” is the simplest 
improvement of the events related with the human factor. The state-of-art in the RH design 
and operation provides the recurrent solution to unintentional operator movements: the use 
of a virtual confinement volume. This Man Machine Interface (MMI) is a virtual confinement 
volume where the operator actuates and it is generated by control software integrated in the 
RH. If the operator moves unintentional the master device of the CMS system from the 
confinement volume, the slave (the proper CMS) will not move. Examples of this MMI are in 
JET operation and ITER design, ITER Equatorial Port plug engineering: Design and remote 
handling activities supported by Virtual Reality tools [44].  
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Therefore, no improvement in the HFE-16 event tree is foreseen. However, the failure rate 
of the software and its interlock is unknown. Hence it has been supposed a very 
conservative value, 1E-3 h
-1
. 
The implementation of a strategy to attack human failure has been a success. The long 
maintenance case increases its mean availability from 91.3% in section 8.3.3.3, to 94%. As 
a consequence, the human failure has only one event between the first 10 contributors 
which contributes only to the 6.5% of the total unavailability. Moreover, the section 8.3.2.3 
base case availability result, 97.9%, increases with these improvements to 98.4%. In other 
words, once the human factor has been improved, the availability has risen from 96.1% to 
98.4% in the way to achieve the availability allocation value: 99.1% during IFMIF irradiation. 
8.3.3.5. Components Improvements 
The cameras in the visualization system were highlight as the component most important 
contributors to unavailability in section 8.3.2.5. The reason relays in the maintenance 
strategy adopted in the first place. When one camera fails (and they fail often, 10E-4h
-1
), the 
RH operation is stopped and the camera is changed for a new one. The downtime involved 
is not much (14h); however, the implication to the availability is bigger than expected. 
The solution to this problem is easy and cheap. The camera is one of the cheapest 
elements in the RH system. Hence, a simple redundancy in all cameras (2 out of 2) is 
proposed as the component improvement. The simple redundancy does not require 
physical independent nor nuclear quality class. The proposed increase in the failure rate 
reliability is from 1E-4 h
-1
 to 1E-5 h
-1
, where the most probable failure is the Common Cause 
Failure (CCF) of the redundant cameras. 
The cameras improvement implementation develops in an increase in the mean availability 
in the 480h long maintenance period from 94% (previous section) to 95.8% with 
[82.1%,96.4%] 90% IC in the long term.  The unavailability evolution is shown by 
improvement in the different events implementation in figure 75. 
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Fig. 75 – Unavailability evolution in the long maintenance case with the improvements implemented 
The availability improvement is highlighted when the module removal case result is 
calculated for this case. The mean availability in this 115h simulation case is 99.3% with 
[89.7%, 98.2%] 90% IC in the long term. Thus, the mean availability result is higher than the 
availability allocated for the RH operation in the most probable situation, the module removal 
case. As a consequence, the implementation of improvements in section 8.3.3 has been a 
success.  
The ACMC motor/gearbox/shaft system and the ropes-hook system had difficulties in their 
improvement implementation as seen in section 8.3.3.5. Therefore, they have not taken into 
account as the 99.1% availability objective from the availability allocation has been 
achieved.  
8.3.3.6. Comparison between cranes 
The RH design [DDD-III] is based on 2 “single-failure-proof” cranes operation. The selection 
of this type of very reliable cranes has a strong impact in the budget. In this section, a 
sensitivity analysis is shown comparing the availability results in the RH operation between 
“single-failure-proof cranes” and “normal” cranes. The design improvements described in 
section 8.3.3 have been considered in both cases. 
Table 23 shows the failure rates used for the “single-failure-proof” and the “normal” cranes 
with a 90% CI. Every failure mode is more reliable in a “single failure” crane than in a 
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“normal” one. Still the “Defective rope or hook” and the “Motor/gearbox/shaft failure” failure 
modes are the weakened in a stronger way.  
Table 23 – Failure rates and confidence intervals in the compared cranes 
f.r (h-1) I.C. 5% I.C. 95%
Limit switch / safety 
interlock 2,80E-07 2,37E-07 6,15E-07
Motor/gearbox/shaft failure 6,00E-06 2,25E-06 2,25E-05
Failure in Braking system 1,00E-08 3,75E-09 3,75E-08
Defective rope or hook 5,00E-06 1,88E-06 1,88E-05
Limit switch / safety 
interlock 7,70E-07 6,50E-07 1,69E-06
Motor/gearbox/shaft failure 1,00E-05 3,75E-06 3,75E-05
Failure in Braking system 1,80E-06 6,76E-07 6,76E-06





The 480h simulation reveals a decrease in availability from 95.8% with [82.1%, 96.4%] 90% 
IC in the long term to a 61.4% with [6.50%, 72.1%] 90% IC in the long term. Furthermore, 
the expected number of failures increases from 0.32 to 1.62, as seen in figure 76. In other 
words, there would be between 1 and 2 failures in the RH operation per maintenance period 
if operation is run with normal cranes. As a consequence, it is clearly unacceptable to 
operate with “normal” cranes in the RH operation from the RAMI point of view.  
 
Fig. 76 – Expected number of failures in the RH operation per cranes type 
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Conclusion 
To begin with, this section introduces the recommendations suggested from the analysis. In 
the HRA and RAMI merge, the RH operation has been studied in 5 base cases. In neither 
case, the availability objective was reached. So, a basic event and a parametric analysis for 
each base case were performed. As a consequence, the most important contributors to 
unavailability have been highlighted. Some of them could not be improved as they were 
already optimistic (e.g. long downtimes due to items dropped). As expected, most of the 
important contributors are human failure related events. However, there have been 2 types 
of improvements described. The ones which reduce human failure in the RH operations, 
and the ones that increase reliability in the RH equipment. 
The design improvements are: 
 The HFE-2 “Drop of load due to poor or incorrect attachment of an item” 
improvement consists of the implementation of a device/instrumentation in the RH 
attachment tool or clamp. This Man Machine Interface MMI would have an interlock 
with alarm in the RH control room. 
 The HFE-6 “Ledging of item” improvement consists of the implementation of an 
infrared camera/transmitter attached to the HROC and the ACMC. The path the item 
must move on until it is in its parking place would be monitored and if any obstacle 
appeared, the interlock would actuate stopping the motion and an alarm would 
sound in the RH control room. 
 The HFE-13 “Inadequate connection/disconnection” improvement consists of the 
implementation of an extra sensor/instrumentation that is able to check if the 
operation has finished correctly and an alarm with interlock in the RH control. 
 The HFE-16 “Unintentional movement of the CMS” improvement consists of a MMI 
as a virtual confinement volume generated by control software integrated in the RH 
where the operator actuates. If the operator moves unintentional the master device 
of the CMS system from the confinement volume, the slave (the proper CMS) will 
not move.       
 The RH components improvement consists on a simple redundancy in the cameras 
of the visualization system. 
The RH design requires not only these improvements but the operation with “single-failure-
proof” cranes as it is clearly unacceptable to operate with “normal” cranes from the RAMI 
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point of view. Once these 5 improvements are taken into account, the mean availability 
exceeds the objective value in the availability allocation [RAMI TTC DDD-II][39] of 99.1% 
during TC operation. The final results are: 
 The mean availability for curative interventions is 99.3% with [89.7%, 98.2%] 90% IC 
in the long term.   
 The mean availability for the long maintenance period is 95.8% with [82.1%, 96.4%] 
90% IC in the long term. 
The availability is not stabilized during the simulated time (115h and 480h respectively) in 
neither of both cases. In other words, the availability in the RH activities is strongly 
influenced by the duration of the RH operative time. The shorter the RH activity, the better. 
On the other hand, the drafting of the RH FMECA has shown that the human factor will 
have a great influence in this type of tasks, which are becoming more and more common in 
a lot of different fields and industries. That is why it is crucial to develop tools with which 
identify and quantify this human factor impact. As a result, it is acceptable to conclude that 
the method designed and applied in this project has been a good approach to evaluate 
successfully the human influence in RH maintenance tasks. 
This project is a starting point, for this reason both methodology and results could be 
improved and used in future developments, not only in nuclear field but a lot of industries 
where the human factor can be important as well.  
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